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INTRODUCTION

The International Law Commission ("ILC" or the "Commission"),
the treaty-drafting division of the United Nations,1 has been wrestling, in
one form or another, with the legal ramifications of transboundary pollution since the early 1970's.2 Two Special Rapporteurs have supervised the
Commission's work in this area, which has been carried out under the
ponderous title "International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law."
The first Special Rapporteur was the scholar and diplomat, Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter of New Zealand. The second Special Rapporteur is
Ambassador Julio Barboza, an Argentine diplomat. When Ambassador
Barboza assumed office upon the death of Mr. Quentin-Baxter, Ambassador Barboza stated and "reiterated" that he did not intend to reopen a
general debate on the basic concepts developed by Mr. Quentin-Baxter. s
With his Fifth Report on the topic, 4 submitted the year of his death, Mr.

1. Article 13 of the United Nations Charter, G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105
(1947), authorizes the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations
• . . for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of interntional law and its
codification." Acting on this Charter mandate, the General Assembly created the International Law Commission in 1947 to carry out the twin efforts of codification and development
of international law. See arts. 15-24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission,
reprinted in United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission (4th ed.
1988). Professor Sinclair has noted that the distinction between codification and development has not been maintained: "[tihe Commission has never, since its very early days,
sought to characterize the fruits of its labours on any specific topic as falling squarely within
one or the other of the two categories." SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 4647 (1987) [hereinafter SINCLAIR]. See also H. Lauterpacht, Codificationand Development of
InternationalLaw, 49 AM. J. INT'L. L. 16 (1955) and RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-

NATIONAL LAW (1977). As a rule, the Commission meets in early summer in Geneva and the
General Assembly's Sixth Committee (Legal) reviews the report of the Commission during

the Assembly's meeting in New York in the fall.
2. See notes 187-212 and accompanying text, infra.
3. Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/394, reprintedin [1985] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985 (Part 1) [hereinafter Preliminary Report]. Ambassador Barboza also
stated that "[a] first comparison of the earlier reports ... with the materials setting out the
practice of States seems to indicate that certain trends and general lines exist independently
of any personal conceptions, and that many of the courses proposed by the previous Special
Rapporteur have already been marked out in State Practice." Id. at 12. In the same report, Ambassador Barboza stated that the "whole topic [would] be entirely reviewed, with a
view not to making changes, but to seeking the certainty which alone gives inner conviction." Id. at 16(f).
4. Fifth Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383 and Add. 1, reprinted in [1984] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1984 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report].
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Quentin-Baxter had proposed five draft articles, which had evolved from
the schematic outline of the topic included in his Third Report in 1982.'
By the second year of his tenure, Ambassador Barboza was announcing
that he intended to focus on the schematic outline rather than the Quentin-Baxter draft articles, and was questioning the "unity of the topic,"6
expressing concern about the continuum Quentin-Baxter had worked out
to accommodate the prevention and reparation aspects of the topic. In his
view, "the concept of 'injury' in the sense of material harm constituted
the cement of that 'continuum': injury in that sense, whether as injury
which had already occurred or as potential injury, which was the
equivalent of risk, was the focus of the entire topic."'
Special Rapporteur Barboza's Fourth Report, presented in April,
1988, also contained draft articles, ten in all. A comparison of the first of
the articles he proposed there with the first of the articles proposed by
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter indicates that Ambassador Barboza,
rather than focusing on liability for injury or harm, would have liability
follow the creation of "an appreciable risk of. . . transboundary harm."
Indeed, the Special Rapporteur's 1988 proposals, at least on their face,
eliminated any liability for actual injuries, establishing creation of risk as
the sole possible source of liability.'

5. Third Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (incorporating A/CN.4/360/Corr. 1), reprinted in [19821 II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1982 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter
Third Report]. Professor Magraw has stated that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
"schematic outline received what may be described as tentative tacit approval in the Sixth
Committee." Magraw, Transboundry Harm: The InternationalLaw Commission's Study of
InternationalLiability, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305, 308 (1986) [hereinafter Magraw I.
6. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Thirty-eighth Session, T 193, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986), reprinted in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1986 ILC Report]. Specifically, Ambassador
Barboza said that
he intended to give detailed consideration to such questions as causality,
shared expectations, the incomplete obligations of prevention envisaged in the
schematic outline, the duty to make reparations and the role of international
organizations, which had all been commented on during the discussions, and to
leave open the question of the final scope of the topic. He had also indicated
that [he] intended to re-examine the five draft articles submitted by the previous Special Rapporteur.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-eighth Session, 29, reprinted in [1986] I
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1). See also First Report on
InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
InternationalLaw, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/402,
reprinted in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1) [hereinafter First Report].
7. Id.
8. Mr. Quentin-Baxter's proposed Article 1 states:
Article 1. Scope of the present Articles: The present articles apply with respect
to activities and situations which are within the territory or control of a State,
and which give rise or may give rise to a physical consequence affecting the use
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Commentary in the Commission's 1988 session and in the debates of
the Sixth Committee that year made it clear that, rather than the approval that had previously been accorded the broad, general outlines of
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's work, this topic had become quite
controversial:9
The debate [at the ILC's 1988 Session] highlighted the fact that,
while the Commission has been working on this topic since 1980, the
project is still at an embryonic stage of development. There remains
no clear understanding within the Commission of the kinds of activities to which the draft would apply, nor is there agreement on the
fundamental question whether the applicable standard of liability is
strict (objective) or based on fault. There is even disagreement within
the Commission over whether the purpose of the draft is to provide
for prevention or compensation. 0
Virtually all the representatives who participated in the 1988 Sixth
Committee debate on this topic expressed difficulties with the risk concept as set forth and defined in the draft Article 1 Ambassador Barboza
proposed in his Fourth Report. 1 Even those who seemed to view Special

or enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of any other State.
Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 2, at 1 1.
The first draft article proposed in Special Rapporteur Barboza's 1988 Report reads thusly:
Article 1. Scope of the present Articles: The present articles shall apply with
respect to activities carried out under the jurisdiction of a State as vested in it
by international law, or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, under the effective
control of the State, when such activities create an appreciable risk of causing
transboundary injury.
Fourth Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law by Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, 17, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/413, to be reprinted in [1988] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER. A/1988 (Part 2) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
9. One member of the Commission, Mr. Stephen J. McCaffrey, who is also Special Rapporteur for the International Watercourses topic (see notes 47-67 and accompanying text,
infra), has summarized the shift effected by Ambassador Barboza by stating that:
During the Commission's discussion of the fourth report, a basic division
emerged between those members who believed that the topic should be confined to activities that create a risk of transboundary harm and those who
thought it should cover the entire field of international liability for transboundary harm. While the former would base the topic upon risk, the latter
focused upon harm and believed that risk should not play such a predominant
role. The distinction has important implications for the extent to which the
draft emphasizes prevention over reparation, anticipatory procedures of notice
and consultation over post hoc obligations of compensation.
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 153, 170 (1989).
10. 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 150-51 (1988).
11. See generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fortieth Session (1988): Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly during its Forty-thirdSession, Rerort by the Secretariat 11-63,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.431, 18 January 1989.
The representative of Brazil, Carlos Calero Rodrigues, stated that he "believed that
'harm' should constitute an essential criterion in the question of remedy whereas 'risk'
should remain the basis for the rule of prevention." Forty-third General Assembly, Sixth
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Committee, 25th Meeting, 31 October 1988, 2, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2570 [hereinafter 31 October
1988 Press Release]. He did not favor working with only "harm" as a criterion, thus covering only reparation and limiting the topic to its current title, believing instead that the
articles "should also deal with prevention." Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, Sixth
Committee 18, U.N. Doc. 1/C.6/43/SR.25 [hereinafter Summary Record]. In his view:
If the articles were to cover both prevention and reparation, then both the
concept of "harm" and that of "risk" might have a place in them. However,
"risk" should not become the predominant concept. If that approach prevailed,
reparation for harm actually caused would be conditional on the determination
that the activity causing the harm involved risk, i.e., in the words of article 2,
that it was an activity "highly likely" to cause harm. If harm had been produced, it was immaterial to try to ascertain whether the activity created risk. It
might even be said that in every case in which harm occurred, there was a risk
of it occurring. The demonstration was made by the very fact that harm was
produced. However, that amounted to admitting that the basis for reparation
was "harm", not "risk". The introduction of the concept of "risk" was unnecessary and might be a source of confusion. If an action was not considered highly
likely, or even simply likely, to cause harm and harm was caused, should the
victim then be left to bear his loss or injury? That would contravene one of the
principles . . . on which there had been general agreement in the Commission.
Id.
Another of Mr. Calero Rodrigues' comments indicated that he did not believe it was
proper to turn the topic around so that its primary emphasis was on risk: "The principle of
reparations was the very essence of responsibility; he hoped to see included in the formulation for implementing this matter, all damages, whatever they might be." 31 October 1988
Press Release, supra at 3.
Mr. Calero Rodrigues also endorsed the idea that liability should not result from a finding of wrongfulness, and indicated approval for a flexible liability regime but one that nevertheless provides compensation for all appreciable harm: "There had been examples in the
past of compensation being given ex gratia for harm caused by lawful activities. That had
been done on the basis of a sort of moral obligation; it was now a matter of making that
obligation, in such cases, a legal obligation." Summary Record, supra at 18-19.
The representative of Sierra Leone, Abdul Koroma, also indicated that he was uncomfortable with a risk-based analysis. He reported to the Committee that:
While in favour of the proposed topic, he had reservations on the question of
liability. He insisted on the need for observing the rule that: a State which
caused harm to another State, incurred liability to the injured State which was
entitled to compensation by the source State. Liability ensued from the very
existence of an injurous act.
31 October 1988 Press Release, supra at 3.
In his view liability had to be linked with harm:
Liability was not a consequence of the risky nature of the enterprise, but
flowed from the fact that harm had been caused to the injured State. That was
a more solid foundation and should be the basis of the topic. Risk was a matter
of fact and not of law and, therefore, could not be the main criterion for
liability.
Summary Record, supra at 22.
The representative of Ireland, Francis Mahon Hayes, was equally critical of the riskbased regime, stating that although risk "should serve as a rational basis for the notion of
prevention . . .and while it was an essential element of liability, it was unacceptably restrictive, providing for a regime of liability that would be rendered inoperable in many
cases." Forty-third General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 27th Meeting, 2 November, 1988,
1, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2572 [hereinafter 2 November 1988 Press Release]. The representative of
the German Democratic Republic agreed: "the term 'appreciable risk' was too vague to serve
as a criterion in actual situations, especially since it limited the range of liability to mea-
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Rapporteur Barboza's approach with some favor had criticisms. 2 Only
two nations - the United Kingdom and Japan - expressed wholehearted approval of the risk-based approach."
Ambassador Barboza responded to these many criticisms in his Fifth
Report " and presented substantially revised versions of his proposed articles, which now total twelve. Ambassador Barboza labeled the ILC and
the Sixth Committee debates of the proposals of his Fourth Report "extremely fruitful," 5 and then went on to spend a large portion of his report explaining and, to a certain extent, altering the concept of risk he
had propounded the previous year. He stated that his emphasis on risk
was designed to avoid introducing the "dreaded" concept of strict or ab-

sures for prevention." Id. at 2.
Andreas Jacovides, the representative of Cyrpus, noted that "[ulsing the notion of appreciable risk as the sole basis of liability would limit the scope of the topic," and in commenting on the Watercourses topic endorsed the "concept of 'appreciable harm'" as providing "as factual and objective a standard as possible." 2 November 1988 Press Release,
supra, at 3.
Robert B. Rosenstock, the representative of the United States, seemed to agree that
harm rather than risk should be the preferred approach: "It was better to consider the actual injury rather than the risk, and to deal within a strict framework of objective liability in
which the causal relationship between a legal act and an injury suffered by third parties was
the condition for the implementation of the liability process." 2 November 1988 Press Release, supra, at 7.
12. Harmut Hillgenberg, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, while
expressing satisfaction that " 'appreciable risk' had been retained as the main criterion of
liability," also stressed that "the Commission should have a clear idea of the criteria of
liability." In his view, the "basis for defining the concept of liability" requires considerations
of 'appreciable risk' along with considerations of 'transboundary injury.' 2 November 1988
Press Release, supra note 11, at 2-3. The Chinese representative, Xu Guanjian, while stating
that "[hle supported the notion of 'appreciable risk' as a criterion for liability," nevertheless
argued that "other criteria ... should be retained because risk, as a single criterion, would
exclude certain activities from the scope of the future instrument." Id. at 5. Helmut Tuerk,
the representative of Austria, stated that liability in transboundary pollution situations had
"two functions": covering the risk of the accident and covering significant harm caused in
the territory of other States. Id. at 4. Francisco Villagran-Kramer, the representative of
Guatemala, while acknowledging the validity of consideration of risk, stated that "there was
an equation between risk and injury: 'risk' allowed for the delimitation of liability; appreciable injury was an essential component." Id. at 7.
13. Arthur Watts, the representative of the United Kingdom, stated that "[hie supported including the notion of appreciable risk, which, even if it allowed the exclusion of
certain lawful actions, still allowed this innovative regime to be reconciled with the demands
of technological evolution and scientific research." 2 November 1988 Press Release, supra
note 11, at 6. Sumio Tarui, the representative of Japan, stated that "[t]he proposed instrument should only aim at activities which created an 'appreciable risk,' as in draft article 1."
He, too, though, expressed the opinion that "[t]he notion of appreciable risk should be better defined." Id. at 7.
14. Fifth Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law by Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/423 and Corr. 1 and Corr. 2, to be reprinted in [1989] II Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1989 (Part 2) [hereinafter Fifth Report].
15. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at V 1.
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solute liability,"6 and to establish workable limits on the topic." Ambassador Barboza did, however, note that "[t]he Commission and the Sixth
Committee were .
reluctant to accept the concept of 'risk' in the form
in which it was used in the fourth report."" He went on to state that he
could not "disregard the important body of opinion in the Commission
which prefers not to use the concept of 'risk' as a limiting factor," and
expressed confidence that "such thinking" could be incorporated in the
draft articles, implying that only minor alterations need be made." Then,
without any further acknowledgment that he was introducing a change,
Ambassador Barboza included liability for actual harm along with liability for creation of the risk of harm in his new first article.2 He rather offhandedly, after his explanation about limiting the topic, stated that "[a]
legal text can . ..mix two different types of liability ... ""
This change, however, did not completely satisfy those who had expressed problems with the "risk" theory, and many still objected to the
Special Rapporteur's continuing focus on risk. While some commentators
expressed their appreciation for the changes introduced by Ambassador
Barboza,2 2 many still expressed concern about any dependence whatso-

16. Id. at T 7, 11 and 14.
17. Id. at 1 4. In Ambassador Barboza's view, there are three possible instances of
harm: the first involves "an injury that has occurred," which must be compensated for by
the "one who is to blame, in the broadest sense"; the second involves situations where "no
one is to blame for the specific act which caused the injury," in which case, "the person who
undertook the activity of which that act forms a part must pay compensation normally because it is he who benefits from the results of that activity" or because he created the danger; the third involves situations where, as he put it, "the distinction between the two [former] kinds of fault cannot be made, as would be the case with injury caused not by an
activity but by an isolated act beyond the control of the perpetrator or by a thing which is
not normally dangerous." See id. at 77 5-6. According to Ambassador Barboza, only the first
two instances are covered by his risk theory, and the third represents the anathema absolute
of strict liability he designed the risk theory to avoid. The third instance, he stated, is one
where there is no link of the harmful act to an activity. Ambassador Barboza has long insisted on using the word "activities" rather than the "acts" of the formal title of his topic,
arguing that it is more appropriate. He emphasizes that, according to his risk theory,
"[Iliability is linked to the nature of the activity," and for that reason the isolated "acts" of
the third instance are not "included in the scope of [this] topic." Fifth Report, supra note
14, at 1 14.
18. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 11.
19. Id., supra note 14, at 1 12.
20. The new proposed Article 1 ("Scope of the present articles") reads as follows:
The present articles shall apply with respect to activities carried out in the
territory of a State or in other places under its jurisdiction as recognized by
international law or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, under its control,
when the physical consequences of such activities cause, or create an appreciable risk of causing transboundary harm throughout the process.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16. See also note 8 supra, for comparison of Quentin
Baxter Proposed article 1 and the first version of Barboza's Proposed article 1.
21. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 3.
22. The representative of Ireland, Francis Mahon Hayes, noted that his country "particularly welcomed an amendment to article 1 so as to give "harm" and "risk" an equal role.
Forty-fourth General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 32nd Meeting, 3 November, 1989, 7,
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ever on a risk-based theory. 23 By far, the largest number of comments in
the Sixth Committee emphasized the importance of the topic, 2 4 and the

need for more innovative approaches to deal with the increasingly serious
environmental problems that face the international community.2 5 Many

U.N. Doc. GA/L/2628 [hereinafter 3 November 1989 Press Release]. Ghassan M. Hussain,
the representative of Iraq, expressed the opinion that his country "welcomed the extension
of the scope of the topic to include not only activities creating an appreciable risk of causing
transboundary harm, but also caused harm." Forty-fourth General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 33rd Meeting, 6 November, 1989, 7, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2629 [hereinafter 6 November
1989 Press Release]. The representative of Bahrain, Husain M. Al-Baharna, stated that
"[h]is delegation was pleased that redrafting articles on international liability seemed a step
towards dealing with that controversial area." Id. at 3.
23. Carlos Calero Rodriques, the representative of Brazil, asserted that "his delegation
had consistently maintained that harm should be the basis for . . . compensation and that
risk should have its place in provisions related to prevention." Forty-fourth General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 31st Meeting, 2 November, 1989, 2, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2627 [hereinafter 2 November 1989 Press Release]. The representative of Canada, Edward G. Lee, stated
that "the two concepts of risk and harm should be dealt with separately," and that his
country's position was that "liability should attach in the case of 'appreciable harm,'" while
the "concept risk" had a "important role" to play in stimulating preventive measures, and
even, perhaps, identifying the standard of care to be applied." Id. at 3. The representative
of Bahrain agreed with the latter part of this approach, stating that "his delegation proposed that the Commission adopt a dual approach to the question of risk and liability. One
would establish the criterion of harm or injury for liablity; the other would determine the
risk criterion from preventive measures." 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at
3.
The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Hillgenberg, deplored
the fact that "after 11 years of work" on the topic, "'clear contours' could not yet be discerned," id. at 4, while the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Wolfgang
Hampe, questioned the risk-based theory, suggesting that further work on the topic "should
concentrate on particularly hazardous activities." 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra
note 22, at 4.
24. See comments of Hans Correll, representative of Sweden, 2 November 1989 Press
Release, supra note 23, at 5 (Sweden seeks "high priority for the proposed convention");
Gerhard Hafner, representative of Austria, 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22,
at 2 (the subject has "increasing importance ... because of growing threats to the environment"); Husain M. Al-Baharna, id. at 3 ("recent catastrophes emphasized the urgent need
for international rules regarding the grave risks stemming from transboundary pollution");
and James Crawford, representative of Australia, id. at 4 ("Australia welcome[s] the new
draft articles . . . because of the increased importance of environmental issues").
25. See comments of Mr. Lee, 2 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 23, at 3
("The time ha[s] come to go beyond the precedents of the Trail Smelter, Lac Lanoux and
Corfu Channel Cases and the Stockholm Principle21, as well as the results of law-making
conferences"); Mr. Correll, id. at 5 ("the Committee [is] developing progressive law where
classical concepts might not apply, since the required approach was to protect the victim's
interest without identifying a culprit. Political and other considerations had resulted in an
overly vague draft, and some means to put it into effect should be included in a new text");
Tullio Treves, the representative of Italy, 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at
6 ("The obligation of reparation at the State of origin for damages caused by activities not
prohibited by international law should be residuary in character . . . it would be advisable
for the Commission to consider in detail the provisions relating to the obligations of cooperation and prevention... "); S.A. Ordzhonikidze, representative of the Soviet Union, 6
November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 3 ("The instrument should be of a universal character and be acceptable in cases covering all forms of harmful activities. Due account
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of those who commented in the Sixth Committee expressed support for
the inclusion of provisions designed to protect the "commons," or the
general world environment.2 6 It is particularly ironic that the members of
the United Nations are thus themselves increasingly sensitive to the intensification of world opinion on environmental matters and are supporting, at least rhetorically, new approaches to defining and new proposals
for solving the environmental problems that affect all the inhabitants of
this globe, whatever their nationality, 7 even while agreement on the most
fundamental matters continues to elude those charged with codification
of international law in this area.
This article examines the risk vs. harm distinction introduced in the
Fourth Report (1988) of Ambassador Barboza, the alterations he made to
this approach in his Fifth Report (1989) and the effect the issue of strict
liability may have on the success of attempts to codify international law
on liability for transboundary harm. It argues that even though Special
Rapporteur Barboza claims that he is working assiduously to avoid the
"dreaded" concept of strict or absolute liability his approach is one that,
rather than avoiding the issue, inevitably emphasizes the need to resolve
it before there can be any meaningful progress on this important topic.
This article also argues that, while the issue of strict liability is one
that should be considered seriously and that a form of strict liability
should be adopted on the international plane in order to provide relief for
those harmed physically by transboundary events, especially in pollutionrelated situations, Special Rapportuer Barboza's approach to the question
of strict liability has, because it has been contradictory, not been conducive to progress. Special Rapporteur Barboza shifted the focus of the
topic itself to "risk" from the "harm" emphasized by Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter, and then reinserted liability for actual harm in the scope
of his topic.2" His Fourth Report can be interpreted as an attempt, by
means of his liability-for-risk standard, to introduce a disguised strict liability standard, but in his Fifth Report he specifically denounces the

should be taken of the fact that existing conventions on the subject were limited and precedents were consequently hard to come by."); Mr. Al-Baharna, id. ("There [is] a definite
need for an 'umbrella' convention in the area of international law."); and Mr. Rosenstock,
id. at 5 (the Commission's work is "a search for ways to respond to relatively new needs and
concerns, a search for 'law for politicians,' rather than codifying even moderately well-established State practice").
26. See comments of Mr. Lee, 2 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 23, at 3
("the global commons should be addressed in the future within the context of the draft");
Mr. Treves, 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 6 ("The Commission would
be missing an opportunity if it were to leave outside the scope of its articles the concept of
global commons, whose importance was increasing in parallel with the general shrinking of
the world"); and Mr. Crawford, 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 4 ("his
country particularly supported the need for articles to deal with situations threatening harm
to areas beyond national jurisdiction-the 'global commons' ").
27. See discussion of Declaration of the Hague at notes 109-12 and accompanying text,
infra.
28. See Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16.
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"dreaded" concept of strict liability.29 What has been lost in this process
is a chance for the international community to debate strict liability.
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's "soft-law" formulations of the
prevention duties of States with respect to transboundary harm also
seemed to be another victim of Ambassador Barboza's approach: in the
past, Special Rapporteur Barboza indicated that his risk-based approach
to the topic was intended to completely abrogate the "soft-law" approach.
With his Fifth Report, however, Ambassador Barboza, without acknowledging what he is doing, seems to be embracing at least some elements of
the Quentin-Baxter approach: he strengthened the prevention obligations
of states and proposed new articles on "Notification, Information and
Warning by the Affected States."
This article concludes that strict liability for transboundary injury is
a concept that the international community needs to adopt in order to
face up to its obligation to compensate for, and deter, activities that cause
such harm. However, that same standard is unworkable for the duties of
States that bear on the prevention of such harm. For these reasons the
scheme developed by Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter to promote cooperation of States for prevention of environmental damage, while not
perfect, is certainly the best alternative possible.

I. BACKGROUND
A. International Liability: The Origins and Bases of the Work of the
InternationalLaw Commission on TransboundaryPollution
The World Commission on Environmental and Development (the
"World Commission"), an independent body established by the General
Assembly in 1983, published a 1987 Report that began with the following
assessment:
In the middle of the twentieth century, we saw our planet from space
for the first time. Historians may eventually find that this vision had a
greater impact on thought than did the Copernican revolution of the
16th century, which upset the human self-image by revealing that the
Earth is not the centre of the universe. From space, we see a small
and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a
pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery and soils. Humanity's inability to
fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening
hazards. This new reality from which there is no escape, must be recognized - and managed. 30
The threat is perceived as immediate. The Governing Council of the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") has stated that

29. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, too, worked to avoid controversy related to the
application of strict liability. See notes 189-98 and accompanying text, infra.
30. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 1
(1987).
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"[e]nvironmental degradation, in its various forms, has assumed such
proportions as can cause irreversible changes in ecosystems which
3
threaten to undermine human well being." '
But the solution will not be an easy one. There are legal as well as
scientific issues to be managed in this area. The General Assembly and
the Commission recognized these issues early on and moved deliberately
toward dealing with them in the Commission. Presently at the ILC, however, notwithstanding broad-based concern about protecting the environment, the most elementary legal propositions remain quite controversial.
Early on, this did not seem to be the case. In 1970, when the Commission
adopted a plan for future work on the topic of state responsibility, it set
aside for separate treatment "questions relating to responsibility arising
out of the performance of certain lawful activities'- such as spatial and
nuclear activities"

. .

. [because, "oJwing to the entirely different basis of

the so-called responsibility for risk, the different nature of the rules governing it, its content and the forms it may assume, a simultaneous examination of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to
grasp. '3 2 The Commission also stated that "[f]rom the outset of its work
on the topic of State responsibility, [it] agreed that topic should deal only
with the consequence of internationally wrongful acts. .

.

.That conclu-

sion met with broad acceptance in the discussion of the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, in 1970."I 8

31. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Perspective to the Year
2000 and Beyond, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/26 [hereinafter UNEP Report]. This Report was
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 42/186 on December 11, 1987 "as a broad
framework to guide national action and international co-operation on policies and programmes aimed at achieving environmentally sound development." See also McCaffrey Fourth
Report, infra note 52, at §33.
32. Second Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur
6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, reprinted in [1970] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER. A/1970. The Commission has been quite consistent in this view, stating nine years
later that it
fully recognizes the importance not only of questions of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, but also of questions concerning the obligation to
make good any injurious consequences arising out of certain activities not prohibited by international law (especially those which, because of their nature,
present certain risks). The Commission takes the view, however, that the latter
category of questions cannot be treated jointly with the former. A joint examination of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to
grasp. To be obliged to bear any injurious consequences of an activity which is
itself lawful, and to be obligated to face the consequences (not necessarily limited to compensation) of the breach of a legal obligation, are not comparable
situations. It is only because the relative poverty of legal language that the
same term is used to designate both.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Thirty-first Session 1 60,
U.N. Doc. A/34/10/1979, reprinted in [1979] II Y.B. INT'L COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.
A/1979 (Part 2).
33. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session
172, U.N. Doc A/33/10/1978, reprinted in [1978] II Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER. A/1978 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1978 ILC Report].
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In 1973, there was again acknowledgment in the Commission that, in
the framework of the state responsibility topic, "it was becoming increasingly difficult to make a clear distinction between responsibility deriving
'
from a wrongful act and responsibility deriving from a lawful act."34
That
same year the General Assembly endorsed the general proposition that
the Commission begin studying the international liability topic "at an appropriate time." In 1974 and 1975, the General Assembly suggested that
the Commission begin work on the topic "as soon as appropriate," and,
by 1976, had employed the phrase "at the earliest possible time,"35 and in
1977 "invited" the Commission to begin work.36 In 1978, the Commission
established a Working Group to consider future work on the topic. The
group consisted of Mr. Quentin-Baxter (Chair), Mr. Robert Ago (the Special Rapporteur for the State Responsibility topic), Mr. Jorge Castaneda
and Mr. Frank X.J.C. Njenga3 On the basis of the report of the Working
Group, the Commission decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur, choosing Mr. Quentin-Baxter for the job." At the beginning of his task, Mr.
Quentin-Baxter expressed confidence in the Commission's commitment to
the topic and in his mandate from the Commission for work that met the
development as well as the codification functions of the ILC.39 When the
Commission discussed Mr. Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report, "[tihere
was . . . broad agreement that the existing title of the topic, although
abstract and rather unwieldy, was . . . an extremely valuable guideline. . . . [because it] enumerated each of the four key elements of the
topic, and was in itself a directive endorsed by the General Assembly as
well as the Commission."4 Moreover, "[a] majority of the speakers took

34. Summary Records of the Twenty-fifth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, reprinted in [1973] I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1973.
35. 1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at 1 174.
36. Id. at 175. Professor Magraw has characterized this as "prodding from the General
Assembly," Magraw I, supra note 5, at 307.
37. 1978 1LC Report, supra note 33, at 9. The language the Commission employed in
describing the topic as it stood when the Working Group was formed is instructive:
In past years, the new topic has been described in varying terms; for example,
"responsibility for risk arising out of the performance of certain lawful activities, such as spatial and nuclear activities," "this other form of responsibility,
which is in reality a safeguard against the risks of certain lawful activities,"
and "a study of that other form of responsibility, which is the protection
against the hazards associated with certain activities that are not prohibited by
international law." In the Sixth Committee similar expressions have been used,
although during one discussion some representatives said they believed that
there might be "a third category of acts ... which, because of their dangerous
nature, fell halfway between lawful and unlawful acts." The simple distinction
between lawful and unlawful acts has prevailed however, and by 1974 the title
of the new topic had assumed its present wording.
1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at T 176 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 1 177.
39. See discussion of the work of the ILC at note 1 and accompanying text, supra.
40. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10, reprinted in [1980] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1980 (Part 2).
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the view that the topic was adequately founded in existing legal doctrine
and that the Commission's task was to develop
this doctrine to meet the
41
unprecedented needs of the present day.'
In his Preliminary Report, 2 Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter focused on the injury the title of his topic commended to his attention and
noted that "the elaboration of rules relating to liability for injurious consequences in respect of acts not prohibited by international law revolves
around the variable concept of 'harm.' "4' He emphasized the good faith
element essential to effectively govern relations between States in the
event of such injury and the necessary subsequent negotiations and agreement on reparation/compensation. He also noted again that his topic
dealt with injuries caused by lawful acts
if such an injury. . . is not caused by a breach of a specific international obligation, a State suffering such an injury or danger is not justified in demanding any limitation of the freedom of action of another
State in relation to matters arising within that State's jurisdiction, except the minimum needed to ensure the redress and abatement of the
injury or danger, taking into account any beneficial, though competing
interests.4
Mr. Quentin-Baxter acknowledged that the basic fact of the topic - that
the injuries or harm involved do not result from breaches of international
law - was balanced by the obligation of States to nevertheless make
good the harm.' With his topic so neatly outlined, with an acknowledg-

41. Id. at

139.

42. PreliminaryReport on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/334 and Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [19801 II Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter, Preliminary Report].
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id.
45. As one publicist has put it:

In the view of the Commission, the very title of the topic is an affirmation of
the broad principle that States, even when undertaking acts that international
law does not prohibit, have a duty to consider the interests of other States
which may be affected. The topic is thus concerned with situations in which
liability does not depend on "wrongfulness" - a term used to characterize an
act that is the breach of an obligation imposed by law through prohibition but rather with a liability arising directly from a primary rule of obligation
generally expressed in the maxim "sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" ("so

use your own property as not to injure another's"). It deals essentially with
dangers that arise from activities within the jurisdiction of one State and cause
harmful effects beyond the limits of that jurisdiction. The object and purpose
of elaborating rules should be to minimize the possibility of injurious conse-

quences, and to provide adequate redress in any case in which such consequences do occur, with the least possible recourse to measures that prohibit or
hamper such activities.
Pinto, Reflections on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 34 (1985) [hereinaf-

ter Pinto].
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ment of the importance of the topic and an expression of optimism about
the ability to develop international law in this area, Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter began his work."
B. International Watercourses: A Parallel Effort by the International
Law Commission
The International Law Commission is working on another topic, the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, that shares many
characteristics with the International Liability topic. The aim of this
topic's codifiers is prescription of "equitable and reasonable" "use, development and protection" of international watercourses."7 The principles
being proposed in this topic embody "a specific application of the principle of the harmless use of territory, expressed in the maximum sic utere
tuo et alienum non laedas, itself a reflection of the sovereign equality of
states."" In its specifics, the International Watercourses topic also reflects many of the concerns of those working on the International Liability topic, and the general obligation-to-co-operate procedural obligations
imposed by Articles 9 through 21"' mirror the continuum of obligations
set forth in Mr. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report 0 of prevention, providing information, entering negotiations and providing reparations. 1 In addition to the general obligation to "co-operate on the basis of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit to attain optimum utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse" imposed
by art. 9 of the Watercourses draft, there are obligations of: regular exchange of data and information (arts. 10 and 20); exchange of information

Another has acknowledged the difficulties involved in the focus on liability, but reaffirmed its primacy: "it is the question of liability proper that alone poses a profound theoretical challenge and has prompted the launching of the study in the first place." Handl,
Liability as An Obligation Established By A Primary Rule of InternationalLaw - Some
Basic Reflections on the InternationalLaw Commission's Work, XVI NETH. Y.B.INT'L L.
49, 51 (1985) [hereinafter Handl II].
46. Professor Magraw has characterized Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's efforts
thusly: "Quentin-Baxter had a rather fine line in attempting to accommodate various conflicting views about some of [the topic's] fundamental aspects and in assisting the Commission in refining its understanding of this challenging subject." Magraw I, supra note 5, at
309.
47. Draft art. 6, reprinted in 82 AM. J. INT'L L. No. 1, 144, 149 (1988) [hereinafter
Watercourses Draft].
48. McCaffrey, The Fortieth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L., No. 1, 153, 164 (1989) [hereinafter 83 AJIL]. See also discussion of the sic utere
principle in the context of the International Liability topic at notes 71-74 and accompanying
text, infra.
49. See Watercourses Draft, supra note 47, at 161-64.
50. Fourth Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, by Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter,Special Rapporteur, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (incorporating Docs. A/CN.4/373/Corr. 1 and 2), reprinted in [1983] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report].
51. Magraw I, supra note 5, at 311-13.
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on possible effects of planned measures (arts. 11, 19 and 20); notification
of planned measures with possible adverse effects on other watercourse
States (arts. 12-14); reply to such notification (arts. 15-16); and consultations and negotiations on such planned measures (art. 17), as well as procedures established for situations in which the requisite notification is not
given (art. 19). In discussing the "large number of international agreements, declarations and resolutions," etc., that "contain general provisions concerning, or recognize the need for, the regular collection and exchange of a broad range of data and information relating to international
watercourses,"52 Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, in addition to referring
to materials relevant to that particular field, pointed to several examples
of more relevance to the International Liability topic, including the 1975
Agreement Between the United States and Canada Relating to Exchange
of Information on Weather Modification Activities,5 3 the 1978 Treaty for
Amazonian Co-operation,54 the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution,55 the 1983 United Nations Convention on the
52. Fourth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur 1 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/412, to
be reprinted in [1988] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1988 (Part 1)
[hereinafter McCaffrey Fourth Report]. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey's 1989 Fifth Report,
which focused on water-related hazards and dangers, also emphasized the requirements of
cooperation, notification and information sharing in international agreements concerning
such hazards. Fifth Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/421 and
Corr. 1, to be reprinted in [1989] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989
(Part 1) [hereinafter McCaffrey Fifth Report]. Examples of these duties as set forth in various international agreements are given with respect to floods (IT 18-29), ice (71 32-34),
drainage ( 11 36-40), flow obstruction (IT 42-43), siltation (1 48) and erosion (TI 51-53).
53. Agreement between the United States of America and Canada Relating to the Exchange of Information on Weather Modification Activities, March 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 540,
T.I.A.S. 8056. Art. II provides that "[i]nformation relating to weather modification activities
of mutual interest . . . shall be transmitted as soon as practicable to the . . . other Party."
Art. IV requires each Party to "notify and fully inform the other concerning any weather
modification activities" in advance of such activities. Art. V provides for consultations. This
agreement, however, has no provision on settlement of disputes, and specifically reserves the
question of liability. Art. VII provides that "[niothing herein relates to or shall be construed
to affect the question of responsibility or liability for weather modification activities, or to
imply the existence of any generally applicable rule of international law."
54. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, reprinted in SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 496 (Kiss, ed. 1983, U.N. Environment
Programme).
55. See note 147, infra. Art. 3 provides that "by means of exchanges of information,
consultation, research and monitoring," the Parties will work together to develop "policies
and strategies to combat air pollution." Art. 4 requires the Parties to "exchange information
on and review their policies, scientific activities and technical measures" to combat air pollution. Art. 8, captioned "Exchange of Information," lists seven types of information the
Parties are pledged to exchange, and, in art. 9 the Parties agree that exchanges are desirable
and necessary. The settlement of disputes article provides no compulsory mechanism,
merely stating that disputes on the interpretation or application of the convention should be
sought "by negotiation or by any other method of dispute settlement acceptable to the parties to the dispute." There is no provision for liability, which is not surprising in light of the
language of article 2 (see note 149, infra).
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Law of the Sea,56 and the 1983 Agreement Between the United States and
Mexico on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area."'
The World Commission 58 has also recognized the importance of the
exchange of data and information: "The duty to provide information may
in principle pertain to many of the factors .. .which may have to be
taken into account in order to arrive at a reasonable and equitable use of
a transboundary natural resource."' 9 The General Assembly, too, has recognized the importance of co-operation and information-sharing between
States, at least with respect to natural resource exploitation:
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or
tries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system
tion and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum
resources without causing damage to the legitimate
others.6

more counof informause of such
interest of

What seems to distinguish the International Watercourses topic from
the International Liability topic is the apparent progress that has been
achieved. Like the International Liability topic, International Watercourses was included on the Commission's general program of work in
1970, and in 1974 the ILC set up a Sub-Committee on the topic and appointed a Special Rapporteur who was succeeded by a second Special
Rapporteur in 1977, a third in 1982 and a fourth in 1985." Despite these
many changes in Special Rapporteurs, the Commission provisionally
adopted six articles in 1987 at its Thirty-ninth Session (Arts. 2-7), and
another fourteen at its Fortieth Session in 1988 (Arts. 8-21).11 As we have
seen, the International Liability topic, which also first received Commis-

56. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983),
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122.
57. Agreement between the United States and Mexico on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Zone, August 14, 1983, T.I.A.S.
10827.
58. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
59. World Commission on Environment and Development, Experts Group on Environment Law Report, Environmental Protectionand Sustainable Development, Legal Principles and Recommendations 95 (1986) [hereinafter Brundtland Report]. The Brundtland
Report, in its statement of General Principles and Recommendations, set forth a general
obligation to co-operate (art. 8), as well as obligations of information exchange (art. 15),
notice (art. 16) and consultation (art. 17).
60. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
61. Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399, reprinted in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1).
62. 83 AJIL, supra note 48, at 160-61. This means that the draft articles have already
passed muster with the Commission's Drafting Committee, McCaffrey, The Work of the
International Law Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 189, 190
(1983). See also SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 34-35. Five articles, including the controversial
art. 1, were previously adopted in 1980.
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sion attention in 1970, has, after ten years of formal work, not progressed
much, if at all, beyond its initial formulations.
But the Commission and the international legal community should
perhaps not be too quick to praise those working on the Watercourses
topic for having made progress beyond that of their colleagues working on
the International Liability topic. It, too, might still founder on the rocks
of strict liability. Article 8 of the draft Watercourses convention provides
that "Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse [system] in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States." Professor McCaffrey, the Special Rapporteur for the Watercourses topic, has described Article 8 as "a specific application of the
principle of the harmless use of territory, expressed in the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, itself a reflection of the sovereign equal'
ity of states."63
He has reported that this Article, as drafted, has raised
the issue of "whether states would be strictly liable for its violation, or
liable only on the basis of fault."6' 4 He indicated that the majority seemed
of the opinion that violation of Article 8 would "engage the international
responsibility of the state in question - i.e., that such a violation would
constitute an 'internationally wrongful act,' "65 but that there was also
considerable opinion that violation of Article 8 would lead to strict liability for the violating State. Professor McCaffrey also revealed that he intended to resolve this issue, for his purposes, by leaving it to others, most
particularly Ambassador Barboza:
The Commission's commentary is silent on this point, chiefly because
of what seemed to be tacit agreement that problems relating to the
standard of liability should be resolved in connection with the Commission's work on other topics, notably state responsibility and, in
particular, international liability for injurious consequences of nonprohibited acts. This same issue may well arise in relation to a later
article on the obligation of watercourse states not to cause appreciable
pollution harm. 6
Moreover, the Watercourses Special Rapporteur has made no progress beyond that of the International Liability topic on the question of
the consequences of violation of the duties to cooperate set forth in draft
Articles 9 through 21. The question of settlement of disputes has yet to
be addressed, and the Special Rapporteur has stated that he will not submit material to the Commission on that question until this year.67

63. 83 AJIL, supra note 48, at 164.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 164-65.
67. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at $ 8, and McCaffrey Fifth Report, supra
note 52, at 1.
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

A. Basic Principles
The most elementary principle in the field of international environmental law is one that expresses the concept of sovereignty, the traditional bedrock of international law. 8 The Stockholm Declaration 9 gives
sovereignty the primacy it enjoys in international law in general by including it in the first of its Principles on transboundary pollution: "States
have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources," is stated

first; the principle that they also have the "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"70 is only a modification of the basic principle, which remains
paramount. Many assert that the sic utere principle7 1 "reflects customary
international law,"'72 but whether or not that is the case, the sic utere

68. As Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter put it:
In order to understand better the hesitancy of Governments to commit themselves to specific formulations of rules as to liability in new or changing areas
of the law, it is necessary to have regard to history. Until the twentieth century, there were relatively few contexts in which conflict was likely between a
State's freedom of action within its own borders and its duty towards other
States. In the field of sovereign immunities, as State activity extended to areas
of trade and commerce, there were some ingredients for a reassessment of legal
policy. The law of the sea was still preponderantly concerned with ensuring
freedom of navigation, and the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea did not yet give rise to any active question about the balance of the flag
State's and coastal State's interest. Similarly, though the law relating to the
treatment of aliens at all times gave rise to hard cases, it did not yet present an
aspect that might be seen to restrict unduly the freedom of a sovereign State
to govern its own affairs. The pressures of the twentieth century have brought
these matters to the fore.
Quentin-Baxter PreliminaryReport, supra note 42, at 32.
Indeed, it was not so long ago that the United States advocated a rule of absolute territorial sovereignty during a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande:
Less than a century ago it was possible for US Attorney General Judson
Harmon without embarrassment to assert that "[tihe fundamental principle of
international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all
others, within its own territory," and therefore to conclude that "the rules,
principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability or obligation" which inhibits a state from using the resources within its territory as it
chooses without regard to the impact upon others.
SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL EcoLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 142 (1979), quoting 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 and 283
(1893-97).
69. See note 81 and accompanying text, infra.
70. Id.
71. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas - "So exercise your right so as not to injure
another."

72. See, e.g., Weiss, Environmental Disasters in International Law, 1986 ANUARIO
JURIDICO INTERAMERICANO (1988) [hereinafter Weiss]. See also discussion of the Montreal
Rules and OECD Report at note 92-108 and accompanying text, infra. This is the position
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principle provides the basic impetus for this topic:"3 Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter has called it "[tihe starting point for the construction" of
a regime of compensation."4
The complementary, but subsidiary concept that also drives this
topic is the principle that no victim should remain uncompensated. 5 The
Stockholm Declaration did not endorse this per se, but does require
States to "co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of
such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.""6 The policy involved here
is one seemingly impervious to opposition: "Society will not allow the cost
of injury to remain entirely on a victim's shoulders as if he were merely a
legal object and not the subject of countervailing legal rights." 7 Professor
Handl refers to "the establishment of an international legal framework

the Restatement takes, announcing in its Introductory Note on the Law of the Environment, that "[tihe principles discussed in this Part are rooted in customary international
law," and "originated in rules relating to the responsiblity of a state for injuries caused to
another state or to its property, or to persons within another state's territory or their prop-

erty." American Law Institute, 2 RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

100 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement refers to the Cor/u Channel Cases
(see note 165 and accompanying text, infra) and to the work of Judge Lauterpacht for support. Judge Lauterpacht, writing on "restrictions upon Territoral Supremacy," stated that:
A State, in spite of its territoral supremacy, is not allowed to alter the natural
conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural condition of
the territory of a neighbouring State - for instance, to stop or to divert the
flow of a river which runs from its own into neighbouring territory. A State is
bound to prevent such use of its territory as, having regard to the circumstances, is unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighbouring State, e.g.,
as the result of working of factories emitting deleterious fumes.

1 OPPENHEIM,

INTERNATIONAL LAW

290-91 (8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1955).

73. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter states that despite the fact that the question of
liability for harm as a result of wrongfulness or as a result of strict liability is the point
where "doctrine falters and parts company with State practice," the principle of non-harm
expressed in the sic utere maxim has great potency as the "principle governing legal development." Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 38.
74. Id. at 56.
75. This principle is certainly one recognized in municipal law systems. See, e.g.,
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall
Drug Co. v. Tigue, 58 U.S.L.W. 3290 (1989). In this case where the fact that the injury the
plaintiffs suffered remained dormant and undiscernable for such a long time that their
cases, when they were finally filed, faced what would normally be insurmountable procedural and causation (identification of tortfeasor) problems, New York's highest Court stated
that:
[I]t would be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a modern society
to say to these plaintiffs that because of the insidious nature of an injury that
long remains dormant . . . the cost of injury should be borne by the innocent
and not the wrongdoers . .. . [T]he ever-evolving dictates of justice and fairness, which are the heart of our common-law system, require formation of a
remedy for injuries. . ..
76. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22. See note 81 and accompanying text, infra.
77. Goldie II, infra note 168, at 181.
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that will assure effective compensation to victims of transnational pollution," as one of the key objectives of attempts to determine principles of
liability in this area.7" In his view, in addition to "the more obvious goal
of restoring as closely as possible the victim's status quo ante," establishment of principles of liability would also internalize the costs of accidents
associated with a particular activity, thus making "the choice among competing goods and services approximate a rational decision because the
price of the items . . . will more truly reflect the costs of production."79
Special Rapporteur Barboza echoed Professor Handl when he stated that
absent a compensation regime
these activities actually transfer the cost from the agent to the victim.
Through the damage done to them, third parties would be paying the
cost that should be charged to the enterprise. At the international
level, other States would be paying for an activity beneficial to one
particular State. It could be justifiably argued that reparation constitutes a veritable "internalization" of costs. Costs which appear to be
unjustly dissociated from an enterprise or activity are absorbed by it,
become internalized.80
B. Formulations of InternationalOrganizations
The principles dicussed above have been the starting point for pronouncements by several international organizations of principles designed
to delimit or govern international environmental issues.
The United Conference on the Human Environment, after a 1972
meeting in Stockholm, issued a proclamation setting forth a series of
principles that have guided all subsequent considerations of international
environmental legal standards." In stirring rhetoric, the Conference pronounced that "man is both creature and moulder of his environment,
which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for
intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth.""s The Conference also
proclaimed that "[t]he protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the

78. Handl I, infra note 182, at 560.
79. Id. at note 157. See also notes 169 and 214, infra.
80. First Report, supra note 6, at 54.
81. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Final Documents Adopted June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11

I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].This meeting has been described as
"an event heralded by many commentators as the onset of a new level of global environmental consciousness among national governments." Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary
Air Pollution in Europe: A Survey of National Responses, 9 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1983)
[hereinafter Wetstone & Rosencranz]. In the view of these publicists, the Stockholm Declaration "still provides the single most important and persuasive multilateral commitment to
the principle that nations have a responsibility to assure that their actions do not cause
damage to foreign environments." Id.
82. Id.
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peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 'a3 The Conference set forth twenty-six "Principles" and an "Action Plan for the
Human Environment" consisting of 109 "Recommendations." The most
important of the Principles, in terms of transboundary environmental
harm, are as follows:
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
Principle 23
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each country and the extent of the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost
for the developing countries.8'
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, in his Second Report, stated
that he saw in these Principles "the need for the orderly development of
international law" in the areas in which he was convinced he had to
cover. In one of the many references in his reports to the wrongfulness/
strict liability and soft law/hard law dichotomies that strain the topic, his
work, and the Commission's consideration of it, he stated that:
The equipoise of the two halves of Stockholm Principle 21 evokes a
balancing of interests that cannot be attained in terms of the simple
dichotomy between right and wrong. The repeated references, in the
text of the [then] draft Convention on the law of the sea and in other

83. Id.
84. Id. The General Assembly reinforced Principle 21 in its December 15, 1972 Resolution 2995 (XXVII) on Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment, stating
that "in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural resources, States
must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside their national jurisdiction." 115 States voted in favor of this Resolution, none opposed it, and only 10 States
abstained.
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international instruments, to the "further development of international law relating to responsibility and liability" is a further indication that solutions are not expected within a two-dimensional frame. 5

The year after the Stockholm Conference, the Council of the European Communities issued a statement of principles and objectives that
endorsed the sic utere concept of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and adopted a "polluter-pays" principle,88 declaring that
the costs associated with environmental protection against pollution
must be allocated according to uniform principles throughout the
Community so as to avoid distortions in trade and competition which
are incompatible with the harmonious functioning of the common
market. "7

The thought was obviously that imposing such liability would act as a
deterrent: "Charging to polluters the costs of anti-pollution measures, according to uniform principles throughout the Community, should encourage them to avoid or reduce it.""8 While this seems to foreshadow the
compensation regime now under consideration at the ILC and can be interpreted as involving a sort of strict liability principle,8 9 there was also
recognition that something more was required to bring difficult issues, especially those related to transboundary pollution under control:
This recommendation is only an initial step in the environment programme and in due course the Commission will submit to the Council
all the relevant proposals, with particular reference to the harmonization of instruments for administering the "polluter pays" principle
and its application specifically to problems posed by cross-frontier
pollution. 0

The next development was the adoption by the International Law

85. Second Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special
Rapporteur1 67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41 346 and Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [1981] II Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1981 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter Second
Report].
86. Council of the European Communities, General Secretariat Press Release (1935/
74, presse 87) of November 7, 1974, reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 138 (1975) [hereinafter EC Polluter-Pays]. The EEC Council also issued a Directive, on June 27, 1985, on Environmental
Impact Assessment, that mandates information exchange and consultation.
87. Id. In this there are, again, echoes of Professor Handl's theory of cost internalization and Professor Goldie's theory of expropriation. See notes 79, supra, and 169 and 214,
and accompanying text infra.
88. Id. at 139.
89. It foreshadows the ILC work precisely because it is, at root, an expression of strict
liability. The foremost commentary on torts in the United States states that:
The "polluter pays" theory of the OECD is exactly the traditional theory of
strict liability in tort, at least as it has developed in the common law systems,
and which is rooted in "the general feeling in the community that 'he who
breaks must pay.' "
PROSSER, infra note 214, at §75.
90. EC Polluter-Pays, supra note 86, at 139.
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Association 9 ' of the Montreal Rules in 1982,92 which were focused specifically on "transfiontier pollution," 93 and which set forth rules of international law that it states are "applicable except as may be otherwise provided by convention, agreement or binding custom among the States
concerned."' Article 3 (Prevention and abatement) of the Montreal
Rules is a seemingly strong statement of the sic utere principle: "States
are in their legitimate activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and
control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of another State."95 Professor Quentin-Baxter, while recognizing the effort involved in formulating these rules and
the beneficial results they do provide, nevertheless detailed the ways "the
Montreal Rules and [his] topic are in sharp contrast and have complementary roles." ' Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter also emphasized the
technical difficulties involved in any assessment of "substantiality" of
transfrontier pollution damage, and noted that these difficulties are "least
likely to be resolved" in situations where the lawfulness of the conduct of
a State is in question. 7 He also examined how the Rules, especially those
embodied in article 3, would operate, and concludes that the "real effect"
of that article "is to produce a very weak obligation indeed."9 8

91. The International Law Association ("ILA"), "the oldest and largest international
organization of lawyers," is a non-governmental group of publicists and practicioners of both
public and private international law. It was organized in 1873 and is dedicated to, in the
words of art. 2 of its Constitution, "the study, elucidation and advancement of international
law, public and private, the study of comparative law, the making of proposals for the solution of conflicts of law, and the furthering of international goodwill and understanding."
Stodter, InternationalLaw Association, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 182, 182 (1986).
92. Resolution No. 21982 on Legal Aspects of the Conservation of the Environment,
adopted by the International Law Association at its Sixtieth Conference, held in Montreal
August 29-September 4, 1982, reprinted in ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal, 1982, 1-3, (London, 1983) [hereinafter Montreal Rules].
93. Id. at art. 1.
94. Id. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter said that the Montreal Rules are "at least in
regard to pollution, a body of customary rules giving rise to state responsibility." QuentinBaxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 24.
95. Montreal Rules, supra note 92, at art. 3.
96. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 26. Mr. Quentin-Baxter notes
that the Montreal rules (1) eliminate "from their purview ... the whole area of the globe
not included within the territory of a State . . . "; (2) exclude "any form of long-range
pollution"; and (3) are only concerned "with the chronic or cumulative effects of pollution,
excluding the release of substances which are merely 'likely to' result in deterious effects" of
the nature described in the definition of "pollution" included in art. 2 of the Rules. Id.
97. Id. at 27.
98. He notes that the comments on art. 3 state that "[firom the fact that causing substantial damages on the territory of the other State constitutes an internationally wrongful
act results the duty for the polluting State to cut down transfrontier pollution to such an
extent that the transfrontier damages cannot any more be termed substantial." He points
out that this Rule is therefore
an attempt . . .to combine the notion of avoiding a wrongful act or omission
of the State with that of avoiding substantial transboundary loss or injury; but
despite the apparently absolute nature of the obligation . . .the real effect of
this amalgam is to produce a very weak obligation indeed. Under article 3 ...
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Another multinational effort to formulate rules on the environment
and, specifically, responsibility and liability for transfrontier pollution,
was published by the OECD99 in 1984.100 The OECD's Environment Com-

mittee reported that it "found that all Member countries recognize certain basic legal obligations, which are the counterpart of rights they enjoy
in accordance with their territorial jurisdiction."1 0' The Committee labeled this expression of the sic utere principle as a "customary rule" of
"due diligence" imposed on all States in order that the "activities carried
out in their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other
States." (emphasis in original)" 2 The sources of these legal obligations,
according to the Committee, are the acknowledgment by States that
"promotion of decent environment should be recognized as one of the
fundamental human rights,"' ' and increasing recognition by States that

wrongfulness flows only from the fact of loss or injury. . . . It does not, however follow - as article 3 . . .and the commentary might seem to imply that the actual occurrence of the transboundary loss or injury will always entail
the responsibility of the source State for a wrongful act or omission; for the
responsibility of the source State will not be engaged unless the State authorities had the means of foreseeing that loss or injury was likely to be caused, as
well as the duty to prevent its occurrence.
Id. at 7 28.
Likewise, Special Rapporteur McCaffrey has noted that the art. 3 obligation of States
to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution is qualified. Article 3, in its entirety
reads:
Without prejudice to the operation of the rules relating to the reasonable and
equitable utilisation of shared natural resources States are in their legitimate
activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of
another State.
As Special Rapporteur McCaffrey put it, the effect of the subordination of the .obligation to the rules relating to reasonable and equitable utilization "would seem to be that an
activity that causes substantial transfrontier pollution injury may none the less be 'reasonable.and equitable' and thus lawful." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 7 70.
99. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") is an inter-governmental entity of industrialized States headquartered in Paris. "Its overall aim is
to promote sound economic growth in the member and non-member States, with particular
emphasis on economic expansion in developing States, as well as an increase in world trade
generally." Hahn, Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA INT'L L. 214, 214 (1983).
100. OECD, Responsibilities and Liability of States in Relation to TransfrontierPollution," reprintedin 13 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 122 (1984) [hereinafter OECD Report]. This was
not the OECD's first venture into the areas of international pollution control and environmental protection. In 1974, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation on principles of
transfrontier pollution, including duties to inform, consult, exchange information and warn
of dangers. In 1977, the Council "adopted a recommendation on implementation of a regime
of equal right of access and non-discrimination in relation to transfrontier pollution." See,
generally, McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 50, at V 57-58 and 62. See also OECD,
Environmental Committee Group of Experts, The 'PolluterPays Principle' in Relation to
Accidental Pollution, Doc. No. Env/Eco/88.2 (1st rev.) (Oct. 17, 1988).
101. OECD Report, supra note 100, First Report at T 6.
102. Id. See also note 72 and accompanying text, supra.
103. OECD Report, supra note 100, First Report at 1 7.
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"the environment constitutes a common resource or heritage ..
The Committee also discussed the "moral obligations" that guide protection and prevention efforts.10 5
The Committee, like many others who have explored the issue of
which is the proper theory under which compensation for pollution damage can or should be imposed, foundered on the "rocky outcrop" of
wrongfulness vs. strict liability. Despite a confident statement that
"[i]nternational liability for transfrontier pollution derives from general
legal principles," and "is engaged by a failure to comply with a customary
or treaty obligation,"' ' it also states that "[n]evertheless, it should be
noted that some Member countries consider that under international law,
a State must ensure that no environmental damage is caused to other
countries emanating from regions under its jurisdiction. In particular,
some of these Member countries argue for the introduction of a system of
strict liability." (emphasis in original) 0 7 It concluded its report by noting
that it had outlined the practices needed for a "policy of protection
against transfrontier pollution," but added the caveat that "[t]he question of whether or not any of these practices amount to an obligation
under present international law is neither raised nor answered."' 08
Last year, twenty-four nations 0 9 agreed on the Declaration of the
Hague on March 11, 1989.1"' Another non-binding statement of principles, the Declaration, like the OECD Report, nevertheless evidences increased international recognition of the urgency of environmental issues.
It asserts that "[blecause the problem is planet-wide in scope, solutions
can only be devised on a global level," ' and that solutions depend not
only on "implementation of existing principles but also [on] a new approach, through the development of new principles of international law
including new and more effective decision-making and enforcement
mechanisms." ' 2
The World Commission's 3 Brundtland Report, 14 like the OECD
Report and the Declaration of the Hague, move to a wrongfulness analy-

104. Id.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. Second Report, 1 11.
109. The signatories are the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Ivory Coast, Egypt, Spain, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Senegal, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe. Sands, The Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 392, 395 n.6 (1989) [hereinafter Sands].
110. Sands, supra note 109, at 417 (Appendix).
111. Id. at 418.
112. Id.
113. See notes 30 and 58 and accompanying text, supra.
114. See note 59 and accompanying text, supra.
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sis for issues of transboundary harm." 5 The assumption in these recent
reports, that the only valid obligation in international law is one that, if
violated, invokes liability because a State has committed a wrong, is at a
great remove from the original assumptions of the ILC for its International Liability topic."' This will be discussed below in greater detail in
Section V.
C.

InternationalAgreements

The principles as formulated by publicists and pronounced by international organizations have also been incorporated in various international agreements, many of which enunciate standards of "absolute" or
"strict" liability and avoid regimes of fault or wrongfulness.
A body of treaties has come into effect over the last twenty years that
emphasize, as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter stressed he wanted to
in this topic,"' both prevention and reparation/compensation. These
treaties regulate activities that the international community has decided
it wants continued, but which it has also decided, in many cases because
these activities involve risks and could possibly cause injuries or damage,
can only be conducted under a liability regime."'
1. The Space Damage Convention
The most unusual of these treaties is the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects." 9 This treaty acknowledges, in its preamble, the ultimate infallibility of all prevention
efforts, noting that the Parties to the Convention had "take[n] into consideration that, notwithstanding the precautionary measures to be taken
by States and international intergovernmental organizations involved in
the launching of space objects, damage may on occasion be caused by
such objects."' 2 0 It takes the seemingly uncompromising position that
"[a] launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight,"" but sets forth exculpatory standards in a subsequent
1 23
article,' 2' and establishes a one year limitation on claims for damages.

115. See note 226 and accompanying text, infra. See also art. 21 of the Brundtland
Report's statement of General Principles and Recommendations, which delineates "State
Responsibility."
116. See notes 32-46 and accompanying text, supra.
117. See note 246 and accompanying text, infra.
118. Many of them fall into the category of "ultra-hazardous" activities first discussed
by Professor Jenks. See note 215 and accompanying text, infra.
119. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Space Damage Convention].
120. Id. at preamble.
121. Id. at art. II.
122. Id. at art. VI.
123. Id. at art. X.
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2.

The Maritime Pollution Conventions

The first of another group of treaties, which pertain to liability for
marine pollution from oil carrying vessels, the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages, was signed in 1969. It holds
the owner of the ship involved in a spill "liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship."12
The treaty establishes a maximum amount of liability for the owner, unless the accident was the result of actual fault of the owner. 1 5 The strict
liability rather than fault-based nature of the obligation is therefore well
established. But like virtually all strict liability regimes, the treaty specifies circumstances that preclude imposition of liability, 2 ' and limits the
obligation temporally. 2 7 It also requires that owners of ships carry insurance sufficient to satisfy their liability under the treaty. " It vests jurisdiction for actions based on its violation in the courts of the contracting
States, " and includes a waiver of sovereign immunity for ships owned or
operated by a State.'30
A parallel series of treaties established an international fund to cover
the costs of pollution damages not completely covered under the regime
of owner liability established in the basic treaties. These Conventions
state that their purpose is to prevent uncompensated damages. "' Contributions to the fund are required from the consignees of oil shipments,
who make the contributions on behalf of their States. 2 The contributions are "calculated on the basis of a fixed sum for each ton of oil
33
received."'

124. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, art. III, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Oil Pollution Damage Convention]. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter referred to this as an absolute liability standard. Quentin-Baxter
Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 5.
125. Oil Pollution Damage Convention, supra note 124, at art V. 1-2. Protocols of 1976
and 1984 to this treaty increased the maximum amounts for which owners are liable. See
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
19, 1976, art. II.1, IMCO No. 77.05.E; and Protocol to the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, art. 6, reprintedin 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 6-77 (7th ed. rev.).
126. Oil Pollution Damage Convention, supra note 124, at art. 111.2.
127. Id. at art. VIII. This amounts, in effect, to a three year statute of limitations.
128. Id. at art. VII.
129. Id. at art. IX.
130. Id. at art. XI.
131. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, art 2.1, art. 4, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57. [hereinafter 1971 Fund Convention]. See also Protocol to the International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1976, IMCO No. 77.05.E; and Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted in 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 6-116 (7th ed.
rev.).
132. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 131, at art. 10.
133. Id. at art. 11.
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Another treaty that deals with liability for maritime pollution in a
manner similar to that employed by the Maritime Pollution treaties is the
1977 North Sea Convention on Exploration and Exploitation.""
3.

The Nuclear Damage Conventions

A body of treaties on civil liability for nuclear damage, are, likewise,
by their very titles, focused on "the desirability of establishing some minimum standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting
from certain peaceful use of nuclear energy."' 5 The 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage holds the operator of a nuclear
installation liable upon proof of causation that the damage complained of
is the result of7 a nuclear accident,1 6 and specifies that this liability "shall
1 3'
be absolute.
The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy states, in its preamble, that its parties are "[d]esirous of
ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer
damage caused by nuclear incidents."'3 s This treaty, too, holds operators
liable for damage "caused by a nuclear incident,"' 3 9 and creates a compensation regime comparable to that of the Vienna Convention although
40
it does not use the word "absolute.'
The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships"" has a similar provision for compensation by an operator
upon proof of causation with respect to damage incurred,'4 2 stating that
the operator "shall be absolutely liable,' 4 3 and the same sort of exculpatory standards 4 and compensation regime 145 as the other treaties in the

134. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, May 1, 1977, reprinted in SELECTED
MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN ENVIRONMENT 474 (Kiss, ed. 1983, United Nations Environment
Programme).
.135. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, preamble, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
136. Id. at art. II.
137. Id. at art. IV. Despite the use of the term "absolute" in the first clause of this
article, the remaining clauses set out the exemptions to liability, making it clear that "absolute" here does not mean without exception.
The treaty also sets forth, in art. VI, a "statute of limitations" of ten years on the right
of compensation, and, in art. V, limits the liability of a nuclear installation operator to five
million dollars for any one accident. Art. VII requires operators to maintain insurance sufficient to cover the liability they are subject to under the treaty.
Jurisdiction, under art. XI, is vested "only with the courts of the Contracting Party
within whose territory the nuclear accident occurred."
138. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
956 U.N.T.S. 251.
139. Id. at art. 3.
140. See id. at arts. 8, 9, 10 & 11.
141. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962.
142. Id. at art. II.
143. Id.
144. Id. at arts. 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6.
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area.
The 1971 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material states in its preamble that it was
designed to parallel the earlier treaties and ensure "that the operator of a
nuclear installation will be exclusively liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the course of maritime carriage of nuclear
material."""6
4.

Pollution Treaties

International agreements on pollution-related topics are less likely, if
they deal with liability at all, to make it either strict or absolute.
The European Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979'1 states in its preamble that it aims "to promote relations
and co-operation in the field of environmental regulation."'" 8 It establishes "Fundamental Principles," ' 9 which commit States to "endeavor to
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution
including long-range transboundary air pollution.' 50 States also commit
themselves to developing policies and strategies "by means of exchanges
of information, consultation, research and monitoring.' 5' The emphasis
is definitely on cooperation and interaction. The Convention includes no
provisions whatsoever for liability for damages caused by the pollution it
seeks to limit, reduce and prevent. Although it has been criticized as ineffective, it has also been emphasized that its "wide scope .. .must be
welcomed."' 52 The Convention also established a "cooperative program
for the monitoring and5 3evaluation of the long-range transmission of air
pollutants in Europe.'
That liability is still an issue is demonstrated by the lack of an article
defining or imposing it in the recently concluded Convention on Trans-

145. Id. at arts. III, IV, V, VII and X.
146. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255.
147. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S.
10541, U.N. Doc. ECE/HLM.1/R.1 reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) [hereinafter European
Convention].
148. Id. at preamble.
149. Id. at arts. 2-5.
150. Id. at art. 2.
151. Id. at art. 3.
152. Rest, Responsibility and Liability for Transboundary Air Pollution Damage, in
TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 299, 302 (Flinterman, Kwiatkowska & Lammers, eds. 1986)
[hereinafter Rest]. See also Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir
Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447,
449, 475-76 (1989).
153. European Convention, supra note 147, at art. 9. This treaty "marked a major advance in the level of international attention given to transboundary pollution and resulted
in the establishment of important joint research and monitor-efforts." Wetstone & Rosencranz, supra note 81, at 15-16. It nevertheless did not require abatement or even impose
"standstill" standards. Id.
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boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes."" This suggests that perhaps
the slow progress of the ILC on the topic of international liability over
the last ten years is not the result of shortcomings of that organization,
and is perhaps instead a function of the unwillingness of States to agree
to limit their independence of action, and thereby, perhaps, their sovereignty, by agreeing to subject themselves to international liability to other
States.
A treaty that employs an alternative to the liability route and that
appears to have a good chance of success is the 1987 Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.1"' The parties to the Convention,
aware, as they stated in the preamble, "of the potentially harmful impact
on human health and the environment through modification of the Ozone
layer, ' 1" established obligations for States "to take appropriate. . . measures . . . to protect human health and the environment against adverse
effects. '15 7 The "shall" of this provision makes seem like those who
drafted this Convention intended to move far beyond the hortatory provisions of the European Convention. Failure to comply with the requirement to take such appropriate measures, or to "conduct research and scientific assessments "158 or cooperate in the legal, scientific and technical
fields,15 ' constitutes a breach of a treaty obligation.
D.

Cases

The exemplar case for this area of law is the Trail Smelter Arbitration. sO The Trail Smelter dispute "covered a period of thirteen years
from 1928 to 1941. '116 A Canadian company, the Consolidated Mining

154. Basel Convention the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.80/3. The liability provision of this
treaty, article 12, is captioned "Consultations on Liability," and provides that the "Parties
shall co-operate with a view to adopting, as soon as practicable, a protocol setting out appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation for damage resulting
from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes." Id.
at art. 12.
155. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter The Ozone Convention].
156. Id.
157. Id. at art. 1.
158. Id. at art. 3.
159. The Ozone Convention, supra note 155, at art. 4. But even the ozone danger has
failed to mobilize States completely: "Eighty nations signed a declaration May 2 to back
tougher measures to reduce ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons released into the atmosphere, but backed away from a controversial plan for an international fund to help developing nations phase out use and production of the damaging chemicals." BNA, Daily Report A-25 (May 9, 1989). Moreover, "[t]he 80-nation declaration is not binding on
governments of countries that signed the document, a point criticized by environmentalists." Id.
160. III RPT. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1911 [hereinafter Trail Smelter]. Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey refers to this as "undoubtedly the foremost international decision involving transfrontier pollution." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 85.
161. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, [1963] CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213 (1963). The
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and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited, operated a smelter in British
Columbia, on the Columbia River about eleven miles from the international boundary. The smelter emitted sulphur dioxide that drifted down
the Columbia River Valley and harmed crops, woodlands and fisheries in
the State of Washington. Canada admitted liability and the United States
and Canada established an arbitral tribunal to settle the question of damages, authorizing it "to apply the principles of both international law and
of the jurisprudence developed by United States courts in disputes between states of the Union."' 62 In 1941, when it announced its decision,
the arbitral tribunal stated that its finding comported with both of these
systems:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another State or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 6 3
Like many others, Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter noted that the
Trail Smelter tribunal, in announcing this limitation on sovereignty,
16
echoed the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case. 4
The reference by the International Court of Justice to "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States,'165 was, according to Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, an affirmation that "the security within their own borders
which respect for international law can offer States is a charter of liberty,
166
not of license.
Although some insist that Trail Smelter stands for the proposition
that transfrontier pollution is an international wrong that engages state
responsibility,'16 7 others have declared that the decision of the tribunal
turned not on the mere fact of pollution, nor on "the creation merely of a
risk of injury, but on the causation of actual injury . . .,"" and that it

description of the facts of this case is generally drawn from this article.
162. Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 33.
163. Trail Smelter, supra note 160, at 1965.
164. According to Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, the language of the Corfu Channel
decision, "which may be regarded as an expression of the maxim sic utere tuo et alienum
non laedas, has been relied upon frequently by commentators and iribunals dealing with
problems of transfrontier pollution." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 1 83.
165. Corfu Channel [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22.
166. Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 36.
167. See, e.g., Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 5 (1985)
[hereinafter Akehurst]: the Trail Smelter decision stands for the proposition that "there is a
duty not to permit such use," and supports the view that "liability for environmental damage is liability ex delicto......
168. Goldie, Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in
Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 215 (1985) [hereinafter
Goldie II].
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depended "upon different standards from those usually associated with
fault." '
Another case often cited is the Lake Lanoux arbitral decision of
1957,1 0 which also points out limitations on sovereignty by emphasizing
that States, in a world with an interdependent environment, must be
aware of and take into account the interests of other sovereigns. In this
decision, France, which "proposed to draw off, within its own territory,
water that would have flowed to Spain, substituting water of equivalent
quantity and quality, so that the flow reaching the Spanish border would
not have been substantially affected," ' was held not to have violated the
rights of Spain. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter has described the tribunal's formulation of the sic utere principle as "so succinct that it has a
faintly sibylline ring: 'France is entitled to exercise her rights; she cannot
ignore Spanish interests. Spain is entitled to demand that her rights be
respected and that her interests be taken into consideration.' ""7
E.

State Practice

In what is known as the Cosmos 954 case, Canada claimed in excess
of $6 million from the Soviet Union "for compensation for damage the
result of the intrusion into Canadian air space of a Soviet space object,
the Cosmos 954 satellite, and the deposition on Canadian territory of hazardous radioactive debris from the satellite. 1 73 Canada stated that its
claim was based "jointly and separately on (a) the relevant international
agreements and in particular the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects' 7 4 to which both Canada and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are parties, and (b) general principles of international law.' ' 7 5 Article II of the treaty provides that "[a]
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight. 1 76 Canada also relied on the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing

"169. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International
Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189, 1227 (1965) [hereinafter Goldie I]. In connection with his
theory of international pollution as a form of unjust enrichment, Professor Goldie states
that the Trail Smelter case teaches that, "in international law, unjust enrichment also
comes out when the creation of a risk with a consequential infliction of injury becomes an
act of unjust enrichment." Goldie II, supra note 168, at 247. He is hopeful that an international rule of absolute liability is now in "the borderland between lex lata and lex ferenda,"
and that even with such an "ambiguous, incipient status," it "may be perceived as offering a
shielding regime for a party against unbridled risk-creation without, however, imposing positive rights and duties." Id.
170. XII RPT. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 281 (1957).
171. Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 22.
172. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at 61, quoting 23 of XII RPT.
INT'L ARB. AWARDS, supra note 170.
173. 18 I.L.M., 899, 902 (1979).
174. Space Damage Convention, supra note 119.
175. 18 I.L.M., supra note 173, at 905
176. Space Damage Convention, supra note 119, at art. II.
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the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"' to which again, both Canada and the U.S.S.R. were parties, and which provides, in article VII,
that "[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space . . .is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or judicial
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space
or in outer space ... ."2178
Canada also asserted that:
The principle of absolute liability applies to fields of activities having
in common a high degree of risk. It is repeated in numerous international agreements and is one of "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (Article 38 of the Statute of The International Court of Justice). Accordingly, this principle has been accepted
as a general principle of international law. 79
F. Ex Gratia Payments
One of the ways that States have traditionally taken into consideration the interests of other States, especially when not to do so might potentially expose them to charges of wrongfulness and, perhaps, therefore,
traditional state responsibility obligations, is by making ex gratia payments. One of the most famous examples of this practice was the
Fukuryu Maru incident involving the United States and Japan. In 1954,
when the United States exploded a test "hydrogen bomb on Eniwetok
atoll in the Marshall Islands, some Japanese fishermen on the high seas
were injured and a fishing resource customarily exploited by Japan was
contaminated by radioactive fallout."' 80 The U.S. Government expressed
its concern and regret and paid $2 million in damages "on the understanding that the sum would be distributed in an equitable manner at the
discretion of the Japanese Government.' 81 Another case involving Japan

177. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S.
205, No. 8843.
178. Id. at art. VII.
179. 18 I.L.M., supra note 173, at 907.
180. Quentin-Baxter PreliminaryReport, supra note 42, at V 37.
181. Goldie I, supra note 169, at 1233. Other examples of ex gratia payments, as outlined by Professor Maier in a recent article include:
[P]ayment [by the United States] to Switzerland after World War II of ex
gratia compensation for the accidental bombing raid of Schaffhausen, [the
Fukuryu Maru incident payment] and, most recently . . .payments . . . of

$1.6 million to individuals whose person or property was injured during the
invasion of Granada.
Other nations have acted similarly in similar situations. The Iraqis, while
denying legal liability, have offered to pay for the injuries and deaths that resulted from the missle attack on the U.S.S. Stark. Israel paid the United
States some $7 million in what it designated ex gratia compensation for its
attack on the intelligence ship U.S.S. Liberty. The Israelis also paid Libya ex

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:2

and marine damage arose when the Liberian tanker Juliana ran aground
and split apart off Niigata, on Japan's west coast. The oil it spilled damaged local fisheries. The Liberian Government offered 200 million yen in
compensation, which the Japanese accepted. 82
Ex gratia payments were in the news again recently, in the wake of
the downing, by the U.S.S. Vincennes, of Iran Air Flight 655 in the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988. Although former President Reagan announced
the regrets of the U.S. "within a few days" and "promised that the
United States would make an ex gratia payment to the families of the
victims,"18 3 Iran has refused to agree and has asked the International
8
Court of Justice to consider the case.1 '
One commentator has emphasized that ex gratia payments are useful
because they carry no legal obligation, stating that, "[a]lthough, in the
abstract, a legal rule requiring compensation might seem to make sense,
in reality, given the current state of international fact-finding and adjudication, it does not."'8 5
This same publicist also emphasizes that ex gratia payments are
preferable when "acknowledging legal liability might be politically unacceptable to the nation involved." He also points out that they comport
with the no-uncompensated-victim principle:
If the problem of compensation is made to depend, in every instance,
upon the outcome of legal argument about the current content of customary international law, it is likely that flexibility would be lost, and,
at the same time, future victims might find themselves denied recompense until after years of international litigation."'

III. THE ISSUE OF STRICT LIABILITY AS TREATED BY THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURS ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
As we have seen, Special Rapporteur Barboza's last two reports are a
study in contrasts, if not confusion. His approach in his Fourth Report
seems to be from the beginning of a situation or an incident, focusing on
liability for the creation of risk, rather than from the end, with considerations of liability for injuries suffered, which has been the traditional focus
of this topic. With his Fifth Report he reinserted liability for injuries actually suffered and limited the topic, as Special Rapporteur Barboza had,
to injuries that are caused or likely to be caused by the "physical conse-

gratia for the downing of a Libyan passenger plane in 1973.
Maier, Ex Gratia Payments and the Iranian Airline Tragedy in Agora: The Downing of
Iran Air Flight 655, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 328-29 (1989) [hereinafter Agora].
182. Handl, State Liability for Accidental TransnationalEnvironmental Damage by
Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 547 (1980) [hereinafter Handl I].
183. Agora, supra note 181, at 318 ("Introduction").
184. Suit Dismissed in Iran Jet Case, N.L.J. 3 (Nov. 27, 1989).
185. Agora, supra note 181, at 329.
186. Id.
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quences" of the activities undertaken. ' He nevertheless retained the
elaborate but still vague liability-for-risk standard that caused so much
controversy.
Special Rapporteur Barboza's revisions in his Fourth Report revived
the debate over "strict liability"' 8 on the international plane, but the revisions of his Fifth Report are, according to Ambassador Barboza,
designed to avoid the spectre of "dreaded" absolute liability, making any
and all discussions of it unnecessary. The approach of his Fourth Report
provoked debate of the strict liability issue, and his retreat from that position in his Fifth Report, obviously designed to sweep that controversy
under the rug, is inadequate to accomplish that goal. Even his readaptations of some of the approach and some of the language of his predecessor
have failed to satisfy those critical of his liability-for-risk standard.
The issue of strict liability is too important to this topic for the Special Rapporteur to try to ignore it. He should embrace the debate on this
issue and work to channel and guide it so that States are able to reach a
consensus. Provocation of debate followed by denial simply won't do.
Strict liability has been at the heart of the debate on this topic since
the beginning of the ILC's work. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
worked long and hard to quell the controversy he encountered on the is-

187. Use of the word "injury" here, and in all discussions of this topic, should, if Special Rapporteur Barboza has his way, be completely abolished. A corrigendum to his Fifth
Report notes that "whenever the word 'injury' appears in the report, it should be replaced
with 'harm.'" Fifth Report, supra note 14, Corr. 1. Ambassador Barboza seems to be slowly,
but inexorably, redefining his topic by changing the words used to be describe it. See note
267 and accompanying text, infra, for discussion of his substitution of the word "activities"
for "acts." See also notes 40-45 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of the honor
paid the title when work on this topic commenced.
188. In this paper, "strict liability" is used to cover what is usually understood to be
encompassed by that term as well as what is usually referred to as "absolute liability." See
discussion of strict liability at note 214 and accompanying text infra. On the difference
between "strict liability" and "absolute liability," Professor Goldie has stated that:
Some writers use the term "absolute liability" to indicate the form of liability
imposed by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher....
On the other hand, Professor Sir Percy Winfield's article, The Myth of Absolute Liability, has been generally influential in bringing about the selection of
such terms as "strict liability" and "liability without fault" in preference to
"absolute liability." Professor Winfield argues that the exculpating rules which
courts have developed to mitigate the rigour of the defendant's liability under
Rylands v. Fletcher render the adjective "absolute" something of a misnomer;
hence the phrase "strict liability" has come to be preferred.
Goldie I, supra note 169, at 1215-16. Professor Goldie goes on, however, to state that he uses
the terms "absolute liability," not because he disagrees with Professor Winfield, but so as to
"indicate a more rigorous form of liability than that usually labelled 'strict.' " Id. 1216. See
also Goldie II, supra note 168, at 194-95.
As we saw in section II, "strict," too, is somewhat of a misnomer. There is no regime
that imposes liability absent proof of causation and, although some regimes may establish
fewer rather than more exculpating or mitigating factors, such factors are never absent
altogether.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:2

sue,1 8 9 and developed his elaborate "continuum" theory as part of that
effort. Although Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter devoted a great deal
of effort to avoiding adoption of a strict liability standard that Special
Rapporteur Barboza has, with his most recent Report, declared it
"dreaded," that is precisely the standard that has, as we have seen, been
codified in many of the treaties and much of the state practice in this
area. It was also the standard that those who initiated the work of the
Commission on this topic assumed would apply in this area of the law.
The Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law stated
in its 1978 Report that
[t]he most constant feature of [the conventional subject-by-subject]
regimes [designed to regulate liability for 'damages inherent in certain
major fields of activity made possible by modern technology'] is the
adoption of a rule of absolute liability - that is, a liability that arises
from the very fact that injurious consequences have occurred, without
reference to the quality of the action that led to the occurrence. 90
Once he assumed the role of Special Rapporteur, however, Mr. Quentin-Baxter began to emphasize the difficulties with a rule of strict liability 91 and to move the topic away from specifying such a standard. In his
Second Report to the Commission, Mr. Quentin-Baxter used a "sweeping
metaphor" to express the strict liability issue: "doctrine is a wave that
breaks and scatters around the rocky outcrop of 'strict' or 'absolute' or
'no-fault liability' or 'liability for risk.' "19' Mr. Quentin-Baxter made it
clear that he sided with those who opposed including such a standard in
his work because "strict liability regimes are always the product of convention, and. . . customary law obligations relevant to the avoidance and
prevention of harm are always founded in responsibility for wrongfulness." 193 In non-conventional situations, in his view, "no very satisfactory

189. One publicist has stated that some of Quentin-Baxter's "influential critics ...
seemed to suggest that the subject was founded on grave misconceptions, and ought not to
exist," while others wanted to "enlarge the scope of 'international liability' in a manner that
would endanger its continued study." Pinto, supra note 45, at 18.
190. 1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at 151.
191. Mr. Quentin-Baxter stated, in his Preliminary Report, that "questions of liability
are almost a forbidden subject." Quentin-Baxter PreliminaryReport, supra note 42, at 5.
192. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at 11.
193. Id. at 12. See also Bedjaoui, Responsibility of States: Fault & Strict Liability,
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., 358, 360 (1987) [hereinafter Bedjaoui]:
However conscious States might be of the vital nature of the interests at stake,
it is only on a conventional basis that it has been possible for them to feel
bound by this new, more onerous and stringent form of liability. That is one of
the distinctive characteristics of this form of liability as compared with the
classic type, which has customary roots. The conventional endorsement of liability for ultra-hazardous activities shows how States are above all concerned
with the reparation of loss or injury, and much less with what is in this context
the secondary point as to whether the State causing the damage acted in a
legitimate or a wrongful way, or exercised reasonable care in carrying on its
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way has been found to demonstrate that this onerous principle is selflimiting.' 9 4 Noting that he did not invoke a principle of liability without
fault, and that this was a view shared by both the Commission and the
Sixth Committee,' Mr. Quentin-Baxter clearly viewed getting this difficult issue under control as one of his most important tasks. 196 In his Second Report he also expressed the view that "regimes of strict liability...
are only one, and not always the best method of discharging obligations
towards those who may be adversely affected by an activity that is
predominantly beneficial. '"'9
By. his Fourth Report, Mr. Quentin-Baxter was expressing the opinion that if the Commission were to identify "acts, not prohibited by international law with the strict liability of the State, it would outstrip the
pace of the international community's advance and would run the risk of
obscuring the genuine, underlying momentum of that advance. '

activities.
Thus, the basic of wrongfulness belonging to classic responsibility is here
supplanted by the principle of causality, the most common feature of these
conventional regimes is the adoption of a rule of absolute liability whereby
liability results from the very fact of injurious consequences without there being any need to qualify the act that gave rise to them.
194. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at $ 11. Commentators support
this. One has criticized strict liability, because, "as its name implies, [it] is not sensitive to
varying conditions, i.e., it cannot be modulated to take account of differences in circumstances. In this respect, it is not ideally suited to dealing adequately with the wide variety of
situations now envisaged under the topic." Magraw I, supra note 5, at 327. For support of
the proposition that strict liability is a sort of genie that, once let out of the bottle, is quite
difficult to control or limit, see Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10
CARDOzo L. REV. 2301 (1989).
195. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra, note 85 at 1 11.
196. He believed that
by maintaining the objectives of the present topic, it should be possible to relieve the extreme discomfort associated with each of the opposing doctrinal
positions. . . . If strict liability ceases to have the apparent character of an
ungovernable encroachment upon the orthodox doctrine of State responsibility, it will be freed to take an appropriate place among measures that may be
required when a beneficial activity entails substantial transnational dangers
which are not entirely preventable.
Id. at 1 14.
197. Id. at 46. By declaring that "[sitates are, fortunately, leaning more towards prevention than a broader guarantee," id. at 1 82, Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter seemed
to side with those who advocate control by means of agreed upon standards rather than
prevention encouraged by imposition of penalties for its failure. Indeed he has denigrated
strict liability by referring to it, "[i(n an [sic] conventional regime" as a "commutation of an
obligation of prevention." Id. at 92.
198. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 57. See also 60-62. Professor
Handl has made the point that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter developed the continuum of obligations and relied on the shared expectations concept of his schematic outline in
an attempt to achieve greater acceptance for the proposed articles and avoid the controversy
engendered by proposals involving strict liability:
[I]n Quentin-Baxter's scheme of things the principle of strict liability is relegated to a subsidiary role. Its strong moral and utilitarian appeal, quite apart
from its foundation in international practice is acknowledged only indirectly
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With Special Rapporteur Barboza there was a great change in the
rhetoric employed, especially with respect to strict liability. As the Commission described its discussion of his Preliminary Report, Ambassador
Barboza was not at all shy about raising the strict liability issue:
In the view of the Special Rapporteur, it was also necessary to consider the operation of the obligation of reparation and its basis in international law. The investigation inevitably led to liability for risk,
known in English as 'strict liability,' . . . in the view of the Special

Rapporteur, it could not be denied that its main basis was simply
'strict liability." 99
In his first Report, Ambassador Barboza identified strict liability as "the
very heart of the topic,"2 00 again emphasizing that strict liability "is not
monolithic" and that "there are various degrees of strictness."20 ' He attacked head-on those Mr. Quentin-Baxter had worked so hard to placate:
[T]he concept of liability for risk, or strict liability, has aroused some
strong opposition in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly, for it has been said, perhaps rightly so, that it
is not based on any norm of general international law." 2
Having stated this, he went on, however, to demonstrate that strict liability is an inevitable concomitant of territorial sovereignty, because sovereignty, in an interdependent world is never absolute:
[Wie have all the elements that are needed to present [strict] liability
almost as a consequence which derives from premises that can be
borne out by pure logic. These premises are at the cornerstone of the
international legal order ....
[S]overeignty is, like the god Janus, two-faced. This is so because
of an inherent contradiction: there is no true sovereignty when there
is coexistence with other equal entities. The idea of sovereignty is incompatible with the idea of multiplicity .

. .

. Thus, the concept of

absolute freedom of action of a State in its own territory, based on the
premise that any activity authorized by the source state is valid, and
that if it causes damage, that damage cannot be compensated for

under international law, is as far removed from reality as the opposite
and in a circuitous fashion ....
But the prospect of acceptability comes at the
cost of a significant dilution of the normative contents of liability.
...The final outcome might be less than desirable.
Handl II, supra note 45, at 72.
199. 1986 ILC Report, supra note 6, at 197. The Commission went on to paraphrase
Ambassador Barboza thusly:
Although there had been objections to strict liability, it had been stated in
support of it, first, that it was not a monolithic concept, since it involved different degrees of strictness, and, when combined with mitigating factors, became a sufficiently flexible instrument; and, secondly, that it was not certain
that it did not have a basis in international law.
Id. at 199.
200. Second Report, supra note 6, at 1 19. See also
26, 46.
201. Id. at 48. See also note 188, supra.
202. Id. at 52.
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assumption, namely that, since it is forbidden to cause damage because it would interfere with another state's use and enjoyment of its
territory, any activity likely to create risk is in principle prohibited,
and cannot be undertaken without the prior approval of the other
States ....
A legal norm, then cannot be based on an international "reality"
which does not exist, since absolute independence or absolute sovereignty, does not exist. In contrast, interdependence has always existed
and is becoming more and more prevalent; it is also the basis in international law for liability for risk . . . . It could justifiably be argued
that reparation constitutes a veritable "internalization" of costs.2"'
The Commission debated strict liability at some length in connection
with its review of Ambassador Barboza's Second Report. 0 4 The discussion at the Commission reflected the deep rifts considerations of strict
liability seem to engender in the international community.2 0 5 Special

203. Id. at
52-54. Here, Ambassador Barboza seems to adopt Professor Goldie's theory that strict liability, on the international plane, provides a means of compensating those,
who like victims of transboundary pollution, are victims of what amounts to expropriation.
See Goldie II, supra note 168, at 212-17. See also 1986 ILC Report, supra note 6, at 199.
Prosser and Keaton, too, say that one of the reasons that can be advanced for a theory of
strict liability is the
notion that the benefits derived from conduct produce an "enrichment" that is
"unjust" unless the actor pays for the harms done ....
Under this . . . principle ... , the costs of conduct, including the costs of compensating for harms it
causes, should be borne by the actor, who in turn will be able to pass those
costs along to others who benefit from the actor's conduct. The net effect is
that costs may be borne by those who benefit and, ideally, in proportion to
their respective shares of the benefits.
PROSSER, infra note 214, at § 85.
Special Rapporteur Barboza's analysis of the current nature of sovereignty, while sure to be
viewed as heretical by some, is not without its supporters. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Jessica Tuchman Mathews has said:
The assumptions and institutions that have governed international relations in
the postwar era are a poor fit with the new realities [of "resource environmental and demographic issues"]. Environmental strains that transcend national
borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national
sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the information and communications revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital.
The once sharp dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is blurred,
forcing governments to grapple in international forums with issues that were
contentious enough in the domestic arena.
Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 162 (1989).
204. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-ninth
Session U 183-86, reprintedin [1987] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 111-13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/

SER.A 1987 (Part 1).
205. Some members took the position that the " 'strict liability' which was suggested by
the Special Rapporteur as the main underlying concept of this topic did not exist in international law." Id. at V 183. Others
disagreed with the assertion that the- concept of strict liability did not exist in
international law. It was incorporated, as a concept if not as a term, in a number of multilateral treaties. The principle was incorporated in the Trail
Smelter arbitration, the Gut Dam claims, and in many other forms of State

.184
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Rapporteur Barboza evidently took the negative comments to heart, because he made almost no mention of the topic in his Third Report except
to point out that his liability regime provides for liberal exculpation, 0 6
and virtually no mention of strict liability per se appears in his Fourth
Report. 0° But, as we have seen, the liability-for-risk regime proposed in
Ambassador Barboza's Fourth Report engendered great controversy.
Neither the Special Rapporteur nor his critics"' used the term "strict
liability," but that seems to be exactly what was once again the cause of
the controversy and the unnamed topic of the debate on the liability-forrisk proposal.
Ambassador Barboza had long advocated including creation of risk
within the scope of the topic, but, as we have seen, dropped all references
to strict liability after the debate on his Second Report. If he intended
the liability-for-risk regime he proposed in his Fourth Report to function
as a strict liability regime, admitting that that was his intention probably
could not have engendered more controversy than the "risk"-based theory did. Instead, Special Rapporteur Barboza has claimed that "the con-

practice. . . . Strict liability was the basis on which a solution to the fundamental problems under the present topic should be sought. The schematic outline conformed to a modified version of strict liability and that was a reasonable approach.
Id. at 185.
Special Rapporteur Barboza
stated that the concept of strict liability was known in most domestic legal
systems, whether they belonged to the civil law or common law tradition. By
using the expression 'strict liability,' he therefore was relying on a common
legal concept holding that, for certain activities or under certain circumstances,
if a causal relationship was established between an activity and an injury, there
was liability. Nor was that principle entirely alien to international law.
Id. at V 186. He also stated that he "saw no contradiction" between that principle and prevention. Id. But he also nevertheless began the process of backing away from a "strict" form
of strict liability:
Strict liability did not need to be incorporated in the present topic to the same
degree as was known in domestic law or some conventional regimes of international law; but what was important in this topic was the notion that the establishment of a causal relationship between certain activities and certain injuries
was sufficient to entail liability. Strict liability provided that basis. At the same
time, it did not preclude modifications the Commission might wish to introduce, such as a number of factors which could be taken into account for determination of the extent of liability and amount of damages.
Id.
206. Third Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw
30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/405, reprinted in
[1987] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987 (Part 1) [hereinafter Third
Report). The bold assertions of his Preliminary Report obviously did not do much to persuade States concerned about protecting their sovereign prerogatives. Gone, too, is any acknowledgment, as there had been earlier, that this topic is one that properly encompasses
development as well as codification of international law.
207. Fourth Report, supra note 8.
208. See discussion of the reaction to the Fourth Report at notes 8-13 and accompanying text, supra.
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cept of 'activities involving risk,'" was introduced in his Fourth Report so
as to avoid including strict or absolute liability within the scope of the
topic," 9 and that "the concept of 'risk' could establish limits which
would, in particular, prevent kinds of 'absolute' [or strict] liability from
being incurred, in which any and all transboundary injury would have to
be compensated."2"0 Bowing to the criticism nevertheless leveled at the
articles proposed with his Fourth Report, he added liability for actual
harm caused to his liability for risk standard and declared that adhering
to the concepts he had set forth would not "incur the dreaded 'absolute
[or strict] liability.' ,211 This, however, as we have seen, 212 did not quiet
the debate or resolve the disagreements over the liability-for-risk standard, and many still remain quite dissatisfied with it.
It seems that Special Rapporteur Barboza managed to raise the spectre of strict liability without even openly mentioning it, and that he has
now extravagantly, and perhaps unnecessarily, renounced any interest in
such an approach to liability. He provoked a spirited but misdirected debate and seeks to resolve it by abjuring any further consideration of a key
concept that he has now tarred with the sobriquet "dreaded." He has
denied the international community the opportunity to debate in any coherent fashion either the question of strict liability itself or the question
of its proper relationship to the problem of transboundary pollution.
IV.

STRICT LIABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW
Despite the great difficulty Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter had
with the concept of strict liability, and the problems it continues to cause
Special Rapporteur Barboza, the concept is certainly not unknown on the
international plane, as we saw in section II above, and models for strict
liability standards exist in numerous municipal law systems. The World
Commission takes the position that the "increasing acceptance of strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities at the national level is evidence of
an emerging principle" of international law. 213 In addition to covering

209. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 7.
210. Id. at 4.
211. Id. at 12. One of the means of avoiding the spectre of strict liability is use of the
"concept of 'activity' as opposed to 'act.'" Id. See discussion of this distinction at note 267
and accompanying text, infra.
212. See notes 8-13 and accompanying text, supra.
213. Brundtland Report, supra note 59. Despite the World Commission's assertion that
there may well be a general principle of international law for strict liability, at least for
ultra-hazardous materials, one publicist writing the same year the World Commission released its report has noted that "there may well not be any international law norm of any
type for international accountability for lawful activities. The survey compiled by the Secretariat [see note 214, infral contains an impressive compendium of relevant state practice
that supports the [Quentin-Baxter] schematic outline in many respects. However, the bulk
of that state practice, at least in its bilateral form, is European and North American. If the
survey is accurate in this regard, the state practice may not be sufficiently representative to
establish customary international law, irrespective of the requirement of opinio juris."
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"ultrahazardous" activities, municipal laws and decisions also deal with
products, including food and drugs as well as many manufactured goods,
and extend, in some jurisdictions, to accidents at the workplace and on
the highway.2 "

Magraw I, supra note 5, at 320.
' 214. The British case most frequently cited as the source of Anglo-Saxon strict liability
law is Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865) [hereinafter Fletcher 1],
rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866) [hereinafter Fletcher 2], aff'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868) [hereinafter Rylands]. The finder of fact pronounced the defendants free from all
personal blame. In a famous statement Justice Blackburn, in the Exchequer Chamber, formulated the rule of the case thusly:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if
it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Fletcher 2 at 279-80. The House of Lords limited the sweep of Justice Blackburn's formulation to extraordinary, non-natural, unusual uses of land, Rylands at 338. With this restriction, Rylands has been widely-followed in British courts, and to determine what is a nonnatural use, "the English courts have looked not only to the character of the thing or activity in question, but also to the place and manner in which it is maintained and its relation
to its surroundings." PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 78, at 546.5c (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER]. In this we see the origin of the special scrutiny applied, on the international
plane, to activities at or near a State's border.
The strict liability rule also applies in the large majority of U.S. jurisdictions, with its
acceptance still expanding. "The conditions and activities to which the rule has been applied have followed the English pattern," PROSSER, supra, § 78 at 549, and "the American
decisions, like the English ones, have applied the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher only to
the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natural' one where it is." Id. And in those jurisdictions where strict liability, per se, is still not
accepted, the type of liability imposed in Rylands v. Fletcher is so often otherwise applied
on nuisance theory, "that it is quite evident that ... the principle is in reality universally
accepted." Id. at 551.
American courts have also adopted strict products liability. As Prosser & Keaton put it:
One of the most dramatic [events] in American law is the rapid spread of strict
products liability throughout American states in the 1960's and 1970's. The
theory has been applied, for example, to power machinery of all types (including cars), to food and drugs, and in a few cases to construction of buildings.
PROSSER, supra, § 85, at 611.
The leading U.S. products liability case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which rested on a theory of implied warranty, opened the proverbial judicial floodgates, and the period since that fall of the "citadel of privity," PROSSER,
supra, § 97 at 690, has been marked by rapid development of liability not based on fault.
These principles were included in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, (1964),
shortly after the ruling in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), the first case adopting strict products liability as an independent basis for tort liability. The cases that followed have expanded the scope of this
liability significantly. Defendants have generally not been able to exculpate themselves from
liability on a state of the art defense, see PROSSER, supra, at § 99. Plaintiffs' cases have been
made easier when it is difficult to identify the defendant among many who potentially fit
that role by the development of alternative liability theory (see, e.g., Menne v. Celotex
Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986), Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948);
and enterprise or market share liability theory (see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)). In all of
these cases, particular defendants have been able to exculpate themselves upon a sort of

1990

TRANSBOUNDARY

POLLUTION

It is in the area of liability for ultrahazardous activities, however,
that there has been the most formal activity on the international law
front. Professor Jenks foretold this in a pioneering article in 1966:
Today, alongside classic responsibility with its rival theories, some
new forms of liability have been emerging which not only ignore the
concept of fault as a constituent factor of the internationally wrongful
act but do not even inquire whether the act attributable to the State
is wrongful. This is the outcome of scientific and technological advances which have obliged international law to adapt itself to new circumstances. Within a few decades, man's power over nature has increased in a spectacular and often frightening degree. More especially,
the harnessing of nuclear energy, the conquest of space, the exploitation of the sea-bed, the transport and use of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, have drawn humanity into new activities which though they
are for the most part not prohibited, are abnormally dangerous ...
The problem posed by these new activities does not derive from

negative causation theory, i.e., by showing that the product that harmed the plaintiff was
not, or could not have been, theirs. But the theory of strict products liability seems to be on
the move again, and a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied sub nor. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 58
U.S.L.W. 3290 (1989), denies the defendants that route of exculpation in certain
circumstances.
The majority of the jurisdictions in the United States have also adopted statutory no
fault compensation schemes with workers' compensation systems and mandated no-fault
automobile insurance programs.
In at least the United States, therefore, the theory of strict liability has evolved to the
extent that it provides significant opportunities to an injured plaintiff for recovery from
even a defendant who has committed no wrong, who is, in a legal sense, without fault.
In other jurisdictions, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities also has wide acceptance. The World Commission has identified national legislation or judicial decisions in the
following jurisdictions: France; the Federal Republic of Germany; the U.S.S.R.; Mexico;
Venezula; Egypt; Libya; Senegal; Madagascar; Ethiopia; India; Thailand; Syria; Kuwait;
Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; Turkey; and Japan. Japan as well as the Federal Republic of
Germany also have provisions for strict liability for various types of pollution damage.
Brundtland Report, supra note 59, at 83-84. See also Survey of State PracticeRelevant to
InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law: Study Prepared by the Secretariat, 37 U.N. GAOR International Law
Commission at 222-34, 11 362-86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/384, October 16, 1984 [hereinafter SecretariatStudy].
Prosser & Keaton view strict liability theory as a natural evolution of legal thought:
In Anglo-American law ... the fault principle was clearly dominant between
the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. By the end of that hundredyear period, however, a number of different developments foretold increased
influence of the strict accountability principle. In the first half of the twentieth
century, the system for compensating worker injuries shifted from a basis in
fault to a basis in strict accountability. In the years since 1950, a second major
shift has occurred-an almost universal acceptance of strict products liability-and application of the fault principle to highway injuries has been eroded
in some states by no-fault legislation. The time may be near, if it has not already arrived, in which more compensation is paid on the basis of strict accountability than on the basis of fault.
PRossER, supra, § 85 at 615.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:2

the question whether they are legitimate or wrongful, but from the
fact that, even if they are essential or beneficial, they embody an inherent risk of transboundary harm. The new liability problem therefore presents itself in terms of loss or injury suffered in consequence
of activities which, however useful, are ultrahazardous, irrespective of
whether the State causing the harm did or did not take every desirable precaution. The new idea is that due 15diligence affords no exemption from reparation for damage caused.
Professor Weiss has pointed out that at the time of Professor Jenks' article, the idea of "liability for ultrahazardous activity was still controversial," but that it has "since gained wide recognition."2 1 Whether or not
such strict or absolute liability can apply in situations other than those
involving "ultrahazardous" activities is, it seems, at the heart of the Commission's work. To some, it does not seem at all radical:
Activities making use of the latest scientific discoveries and concerned
with modern forms of utilization or exploitation of the sea, of space or
of nuclear energy are not the only ones to pose such problems. There
are also more traditional activities or subject matters to which such
absolute liability management appropriately apply: for example, the
use and regulation of rivers that traverse or separate the territories of
several States

. .

. the prevention of damage caused by floods or the

melting of the snows; the exploitation of land in border areas; the
propagation of fire or explosions across national frontiers; the contamination of human beings, animals or plants by diseases from other
countries; the transfrontier pollution of fresh water." '
215. Jenks, Liability for UltrahazardousActivities in InternationalLaw, 117 RECUEIL
DE COURS 99 (1966).

216. Weiss, supra note 72. Professor Weiss noted, however, that the evolution of tort
law strict liability seems not to have extended beyond such ultra-hazardous activities, because her "recent review of more than 80 treaties dealing with international responsibility in
the environmental field revealed that they primarily addressed ultrahazardous activities or
massive oil pollution of the marine environment, rather than more general transfrontier environmental harm." Id. See also Gaines, InternationalPrinciples for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse? 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 316-17 (1989) [hereinafter Gaines]: "international law has accumulated
a growing body of treaties, conventions, and other indicia of 'State practice' with respect to
ultrahazardous activities and certain other narrowly defined problems. To this extent, the
concept of transnational liability has already gained international acceptance."
217. Bedjaoui, supra note 193, at 361. Mr. Bedjaoui went on to express the opinion that
"[tlo some minds, it is not inconceivable that one day such liability may even become applicable in the international economic and financial field, for example, in the case of transboundary losses sustained by foreign states or their nationals on account of a State's sovereign decision to devalue its own currency." Id. This precise question has been the source of
considerable controversy in connection with this topic.
Although Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, in his Preliminary Report, noted that
"the specific context in which the topic is discussed has always been that of environmental
hazard, caused by human activity and magnified by modern industrial and technological
needs and capacities," Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 40, at 14, he also
stated that even though most of the examples he used in his Preliminary Report were
"drawn from the field of the environment . . . an attempt [was] made to show that the
principle reflected in the title of the topic does not limit itself to the field of the environ-
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Transboundary pollution in general certainly belongs on this list.
V.

EFFECTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR BARBOZA'S APPROACH TO THE ISSUE
OF STRICT LIABILITY

A.

The "Wrongfulness" Issue

As we have seen, Special Rapporteur Barboza has tried to effect a
major revision of the scope and perhaps the intent of the draft articles on
state liability for injuries caused by acts or activities not contrary to international law. His "liability for risk" was arguably nothing more than
the "strict liability" assumed to be the standard when this topic was
launched. But even the indirect debate of strict liability this proposed
standard provoked proved once again, as it has since the beginning of
consideration of this topic, to be a source of contention in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee.
One of the by-products of Ambassador Barboza's focus on risk and
struggle with the strict liability issue was a revival of the basic issue of
wrongfulness versus acts not prohibited by international law and how liability/reparation schemes should properly be constructed." 8 He pointed
out that in the 1987 Commission debates it was noted that "polluting

ment." Id. at 62. The Draft Articles initially proposed did not limit the topic to the field of
the environment, and the provision on the scope of the articles provided that they would
apply when "activities undertaken within the territory or jurisdiction of a State give rise,
beyond the territory of that State, to actual or potential loss of injury to another State or to
" Second Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences
its nationals ..
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [1981] II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1981 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter
First Report].
By the time of his Fourth Report, Mr. Quentin-Baxter was referring to the "physical"
limitation as one made as a matter of course: "there is a rather general expectation that the
field of application will include all physical uses of territory giving rise to adverse physical
transboundary effects." Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 48, at 17. By the Fifth
Report, the limitation was definite: "the activities and situations with which the present
topic deals must themselves have a physical quality, and the consequences must flow from
22that quality.
... Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 18. See also id. at
34.
There was an initial hint from Special Rapporteur Barboza that he would, as part of his
special efforts to address the concerns of Third World nations in connection with this topic,
consider expanding the topic once again. In the 1986 ILC Report on its consideration of the
topic, it was noted that Special Rapporteur Barboza "had accepted, as a point of departure,
that the topic related primarily to the duties of the source State to avoid, minimize or repair
any appreciable or tangible physical transboundary loss or injury caused by an activity involving risk. However, the Special Rapporteur did not rule out the possibility of modifying
this scope if the development of the topic made it desirable." 1986 ILC Report, supra note
6, at 195. This, however, was completely precluded by the time of Ambassador Barboza's
Fourth Report, in which he said that "in connection with international economic issues especially those relating to the adumbration of the new international economic order," the
topic had the potential to be "either a rogue elephant or a useful beast of burden," Fourth
Report, supra note 8, at 46. See also Gaines, supra note 216, at 314-16, 322-26.
218. See notes 45 & 193 and accompanying text, supra.
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activities which produced their effects gradually, cumulatively and continually, presented a problem as to their inclusion in our draft." ' Raising an issue that has been raised on many occasions by publicists,2 0 he
stated that "[t]he first question is whether pollution that causes appreciable injury is prohibited by general international law. ' 221 Such pollution
might be "prohibited by general international law," and would therefore
"not fall within the purview of [the] topic because [it would involve] dealing with an unlawful act. ' 2' Nevertheless, after minimal consideration,

219. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at T 8.
220. Most notably, Professor Handl, who takes the view that "the debate within the
Preparatory Committee charged with drafting the Stockholm Declaration clearly reveals
strong opposition by several delegates to the idea that Principle 21 could be interpreted as
imposing absolute or strict liability." Handl I, supra note 182, at 536. State practice, too, he
believes, supports his "fault, not strict liability" theory: "clear confirmation of the fault
principle as the international legal standard for transnational pollution in general emerges
from an analysis of different instances when the issue of liability was pertinently raised." Id.
at 536-37. He accepts strict liability only in situations involving accidents: "the distinctive
criterion [is] continuous as against accidental transfrontier pollution[:] . . . the former engages the international liability of the controlling state only when the state incurs fault in
failing to prevent the damage from occurring, while the latter involves strict liability." Id. at
541. He has labeled the ILC's work on the international liability issue an "awkward" situation because it indicates "prima facie ... the existence in general international law of strict
state liability." Id. at 551. See also Handl II, supra note 45, at 50-51.
221. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at T 9.
222. Id. Although Special Rapporteur Barboza goes on to state that he believes that the
Commission would not "unanimously accept" the idea that there is such a prohibition, id. at
9 10, he tips his hand by also stating that:
Continuous pollution functions by accumulation. Pollutants which, in small
quantities and for a limited period of time, would not cause appreciable transboundary injury, accumulate after a certain period of uninterrupted flow and
cause such injury. An activity resulting in substantial transboundary injury
cannot be allowed to continue unpunished and without the establishment of
some form of regulation.
Id. at 1 12 (emphasis added). Punishment, of course, implies wrongfulness. Liability for
injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law would involve compensation and restitution, if possible, to the condition that obtained before the injury. See also
Third Report, supra note 206, at V 60(b).
On the issue of the wrongfulness/strict liability distinction, it might be helpful to consider the views of domestic law experts in this area. Strict liability is generally thought of as
liability without fault, but Prosser and Keaton question the traditional nomenclature thusly:
[Ilt may be questioned whether "fault," with its popular connotation of personal guilt and moral blame, and its more or less arbitrary legal meaning,
which will vary with the requirements of social conduct imposed by the law, is
of any real assistance in dealing with such questions, except perhaps as a descriptive term. It might be quite as easy to say that one who conducts blasting
operations which may injure a neighbor is at "fault" in conducting them at all,
and is privileged to do so only in so far as he insures that no harm shall result,
as to say that he is not at fault, but is liable nevertheless. If he is not "at fault"
because the social desirability of the blasting justifies the risk, his conduct is
still so far socially questionable that it does not justify immunity. The basis of
his liability in either case is the creation of an undue risk of harm to other
members of the community. It has been said that there is "conditional fault,"
meaning that the defendant is not to be regarded as at fault unless or until his

1990

TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION

Ambassador Barboza concluded that he did not think "the Commission
would unanimously accept" the idea that there is "a prohibition at an
operative level against acts which give rise to appreciable injury by means
of transboundary pollution." 2 3

conduct causes some harm to others, but he is then at fault, and to be held
responsible.
Once the legal concept of "fault" is divorced, as it has been, from the personal standard of moral wrongdoing, there is a sense in which liability with or
without "fault" must beg its own conclusion. The term requires such extensive
definition, that it seems better not to make use of it at all, and to refer instead
to strict liability, apart from either wrongful intent or negligence.
PROSSER, supra note 214, § 75, at 537-38.
Despite the simple elegance of an approach that refuses to founder on the "rocky outcrop" of strict liability, there have been articulate formulations of why maintaining the distinction between liability for acts that are wrong and liability for acts that are not wrong is
desirable:
Since compensation is of course payable for wrongful acts, it may be wondered
whether there is any real difference between a duty to pay compensation for a
lawful act and a duty to pay compensation for a wrongful act. It is submitted,
however, that the distinction is important for two reasons. First, the amount of
compensation payable for a lawful act is probably less than the amount of
compensation payable for a wrongful act ...
The second point is that a certain stigma attaches to the commission of an
unlawful act. States may therefore be reluctant to pay compensation for
wrongful acts because they are unwilling to admit they have done anything
wrong. They may be more willing to pay compensation for lawful acts, because
such payments do not imply a confession of wrong doing. A rule requiring payment of compensation for lawful acts "should make easier a just, effective and
amicable settlement of any liability that may arise."
Akehurst, supra note 167, at 14-15.

Although there is some logic to [the] argument, the prospect of disregarding
the distinction between wrongful and nonwrongful acts under international law
is troublesome. First, it would diminish the stigma attaching to States that
engage in internationally wrongful activity ...
Second, a state cannot normally avoid the prohibition against engaging in
internationally wrongful acts by making monetary reparations . . . whereas

such reparations may fulfill a state's obligations for nonwrongful acts ...
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 318.
The unwillingness of States to admit they have done anything wrong is illustrated best
in the examples of ex gratia payments examined above in notes 180-86 and accompanying
text, supra. It also seems plausible that States, especially developing States with an appetite
for more industry and technology as well as States of all types concerned about preservation
of their sovereign prerogatives, might be more willing to submit to a regime that, rather
than limiting their internal activities and giving other sovereigns the ability to require such
limitations, requires them, upon occurrence of a certain event, and only under those circumstances, to make reparations or pay compensation on a no-fault, even vaguely ex gratia-type
basis. See discussion in Magraw, The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability for Non-Prohibited Acts as it Relates to Developing States, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1041, 1053 (1986) [hereinafter Magraw II].
223. Id. at 1 10. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, too, has reached the same conclusion:
"it is doubtful that pollution, per se, of an international watercourse can be said to be proscribed by contemporary international law." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at
89 (Comment (4)). But see Sands, supra note 109, at 35, which discusses the movement, as
exemplified by the Declaration of the Hague [see notes 109-112 and accompanying text,
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Special Rapporteur Barboza thus skirted issues that special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter had skirted as well:2"" whether all transboundary
pollution, by definition, is wrong, and whether consideration of that type
of injury within this topic is therefore more appropriately within the
scope of the State Responsibility topic of the Commission."' The World
Commission's Brundtland Report22 6 supports the wrongfulness approach.
It specifically states, in Article 21, that:
1. A State is responsible under international law for a breach of an
international obligation relating to the use of a natural resources or
the prevention or abatement of an environmental interference.
Reparation and/or compensation follow such an establishment of responsibility. Article 21 continues thusly:
2. In particular, it [the responsible State] shall: a. cease the internationally wrongful act; b. as far as possible re-establish the situation
which would have existed if the internationally wrongful act had not
taken place; c. provide compensation for the harm which results from
the internationally wrongful act; d. where 7appropriate, give satisfaction for the internationally wrongful act.1
Entangled in this are various legal and policy concerns, which, if not
considered and settled carefully, could do great harm to the establishment of standards for the regulation and prevention of such polluting activities and the compensation for harms they might cause. Considerations
of sovereignty, social benefit, third world versus first world and complex
technical issues are all in this mix.
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter was concerned about strict liability being perceived as impinging upon state sovereignty by virtue of imposing a sort of state responsibility.22 And there are those who interpret

supra], toward recognition of "environmental degradation as a human rights issue affecting
'the right to live in dignity in a viable global environment.' [The Declaration] implicitly
accepts the legal right of individuals to protection of the international enviroment."
224. Special Rapporteur Barboza, in his Fifth Report, links this discussion from his
Fourth Report to his differention of liability for activities from liability for isolated acts,
which, he claims, is tantamount to the "dreaded" concept of strict liability. See discussion
of this distinction at note 267, infra and in his Fifth Report, supra note 14, at I 4-15.
225. Among the most vociferous of those who object to special consideration of the liability that can be incurred as the result of lawful acts is Professor Brownlie:
The Commission's decision to consider state responsibility and international
liability separately, despite the latter topic's derivation from the former, has
not met with universal approval. One commentator, Ian Brownlie, has objected
to considering international liability at all on grounds that it is "fundamentally
misconceived" in a manner that "may induce a general confusion in respect of
the principle of state responsibility."
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 316, quoting BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Part 1)

50 (1983).

226. Brundtland Report, supra note 59, at 32.

227. Id.
228. See note 196 and accompanying text, supra.
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the Trail Smelter decision and the sic utere principle as focused on the
act of polluting, rather than on the injury caused by pollution sufficient to
cause harm transnationally. While environmentalists in particular might
wish to classify all pollutants and set standards to regulate their discharge, 29 working all the time toward the goal of prohibiting all pollution, with the violation of those standards amounting to an international
wrong; the better approach for the Commission is one that works to establish residual rules to apply in situations for which no such specific
rules apply.23 Moreover, aside from the technical problems involved in
establishing such standards, this also would simply remove considerations
of transboundary pollution from this topic. Admittedly, establishment of
specific environmental standards to insure that pollution problems are
avoided is the ideal, but that is not a solution that can be achieved soon
or easily, or one that States will accept willingly. The best approach the
ILC can take is to work diligently on developing interim rules that can
provide some generally accepted international principles that will apply
until the ideal can be reached.
In the past Ambassador Barboza gave at least lip service to this approach. He echoed the sentiments of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
stating that the objective of his work was to "meet the fairly modest
objectives of the draft, namely, to encourage States to work out agreements regulating activit[ies involving risk], and, in the interim, to establish certain basic general and minimally exigent duties."2 '' But he is most
recently on record as being uncomfortable with including in the scope of
the topic the one type of risk-producing activity, transboundary pollution,

229. This is the approach of environmental statutes and regulations in the United
States. See, e.g.: the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91i, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2601-71, which regulate air quality; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the "Clean
Water Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f300j-26, which regulate water quality; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-91i, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-31, and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 42 U.S.C. §§
9602-75("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), which regulate land disposal and clean-up of hazardous waste. Note, too, that CERCLA imposes a stringent strict liability regime. See Gaines,
supra note 216, at 330-33. For European examples, see Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboudnary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transbroundary Fluxes, October 31, 1988 and Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulpher Emissions or
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 Percent, July 1, 1985.
230. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey has demonstrated that outright bans of pollution
were included in treaties of the nineteenth and very early twentieth centuries, but were
replaced by treaty provisions designed to set standards, e.g., to insure that the quality of the
water would not be harmed. See McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 39-40. Some
more modern agreements do set quality standards to be met or maintained, sometimes including annexes with 'black' lists of prohibited substances and 'grey' lists of substances to
be regulated, while others establish joint commissions to deal with pollution issues. Id. at 1
43-48.
231. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 4.
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that is least likely to be the subject of a general international agreement
because it lacks the hazardous crisis immediacy of many of the other activities that have been the subject of international agreements.132 He had
earlier, when he embraced strict liability, acknowledged this problem. In
his view, perhaps it is a theory that can only properly be applied to dangers that are not preventable - so that "garden variety" transboundary
pollution issues, which are really the only significant ones not yet subjected to a conventional regime, should not be governed by a strict-liablity-for-harm-from-legal-activities standard. Implicit in this are the assumptions that (1) there should be no pollution; (2) that all pollution that
affects another sovereign involves an international wrong; and (3) that
this area should be excluded from the Commission's work on this topic,
with perhaps the establishment of international standards, which, if met,
would create a presumption of no wrongfulness. 3 But, despite the
trouble Ambassador Barboza seems to have encountered on the issue of
strict liability, even the General Assembly has recognized and endorsed
the idea that environmental harms must be corrected or compensated for
by those who cause them. There is no insistence on a finding of wrongfulness. Indeed, the General Assembly seems-to endorse a prevention regime
like that of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter as the other half of a
proper international environmental law regime: "[e]nvironmental degradation can be controlled and reversed only by ensuring that the parties
causing the damage will be accountable for their action, and that they
will participate, on the basis of full access to available knowledge, in im2 34
proving environmental conditions.
But it is precisely transboundary pollution, and issues like it, that
States will not acknowledge are wrongful per se and that do not (unless
and until they reach crisis proportions, like the U.S.-Canada acid rain
dispute) attract the attention, mobilize the concern and engender the
fears of impending doom that experience demonstrates are necessary for
States to consider adopting conventional regimes."' That isprecisely why

232. Indeed, when he defined "activities involving risk," Ambassador Barboza set out a
laundry list of activities most of which are already covered by international agreements. He
referred to activities
entailing the use of substances which are intrinsically dangerous, or potentially
dangerous because of the place, environment or way in which they are used.
Intrinsically dangerous substances would include, for example, explosives, radioactive, toxic or flammable materials, or materials which cause damage to the
human organism or the environment as a result of contact or proximity. ...
One example of [substances that may be dangerous because they are used in
large quantities] is crude oil when it is being transported. ...
Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 22.
233. See First Report, supra, note 6, at
30-33.
234. UNEP Report, supra note 31, at 3(i).
235. In other words, it is only in the areas where there is no law already that it is
difficult for the Commission to discern what the law is or should be:
The problem arises, of course, only in those situations in which the conduct is
not readily identifiable as violative of an international obligation, or in other
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residual rules are necessary. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, like Special
Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, has stated that he views his task for the Watercourses topic as one of drafting articles that "set forth residual
rules,"2 6" i.e., to provide a general legal regime for situations in which
special agreements do not apply and in which special joint commissions
or other regulatory agencies are not in place. He specifically states that
the standard setting "list" approach23 7 is not "appropriate in a framework
instrument of a general nature" such as the draft articles on the Watercourses and the International Liability topics. 2 3 8 If transboundary pollution and issues like it are not dealt with by the Commission, and if the
concerted effort to codify or, if necessary, develop, general rules that govern such situations is abandoned, it will surely result in no international
mechanism whatsoever. Victims of the polluting activities of foreign sovereigns or other foreign entities will thus be allowed to go
uncompensated.
In his Fifth Report, Special Rapporteur Barboza acknowledges the
persistence of difficulty with the wrongfulness issue. He predicts that the
current developments, divided as they are, point toward emergence of, in
effect, "two conventions, except that the two r6gimes (one of responsibility for wrongfulness and the other of causal liability) would coexist in the
same instrument. ' 2 9 According to Ambassador Barboza, "[t]he result
would be that, if injury occurred as a result of a breach of obligation of
prevention, responsibility for wrongfulness, with all that this involves,
would apply, while if those were fulfilled, causal liability, also with its
attendant laws, would apply. ' 24 0 He acknowledges the logical inconsistency of the position he seemingly advocates, with his characteristic disregard for the established parameters or definitions of his topic and with
his typical reliance on the new distinctions he has introduced to those
parameters and definitions:
It was pointed out that there was an inconsistency here with our mandate of dealing with liability for acts "not prohibited". Aside from the
indifference shown by members to this apparent contradition, it can
be argued that this reasoning is applicable to a topic which deals with
"acts", not "activities": our mandate involves dealing with the consequences of certain wrongful acts which are inextricably linked to an
activity which is not prohibited. The activity would continue to be

words, does not contravene a specific conduct-related norm of international
law. Where, for example, States fail to comply with specific international pollutant emission or discharge standards, there can be no doubt about State
responsibility.
Handl II, supra note 45, at 57.
236. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 27 (Comment (7)).
237. See note 230 and accompanying text, supra.
238. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 89 (Comment (11)).
239. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 48. See generally discussion at
40-54.
240. Id. at 1 48.
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allowed and only the injurious "act" would have to cease.2

1

Finally, and astonishingly, he recommends as the best solution a
combination of a "soft-law" approach to the obligation of prevention and
imposition of a strict liability regime for reparation of harms actually
caused, the precise regime he has labelled "dreaded" and worked assiduously to prevent being subjected to reasoned scrutiny and debate by the
international community:
Ironically, the least harsh solution for the State of origin would be the
existence of a single r6gime: that of causal or strict liability. Such a
regime would function as follows: prevention would not be required as
a separate obligation but would simply arise from the deterrent effect
of reparation under the regime of strict liability. [The prevention article] would simply be an appendix to the obligations to co-operate and
would be without consequences in the event of a breach (except that,
if injury ocurred, compliance with obligations of prevention would entitle the State of origin to pay reduced compensation). It would also
offer the following advantages: (a) State conduct would not be qualified as wrongful; (b) an easy mechanism for assigning obligations
would be established; (c) reparation would be required which sought
only to restore the balance of interests, instead of being guided by the
principle of total restitution; and (d) lastly, the act would not have to
cease, although its effects would be the subject of reparation, and this
could sometimes produce a more flexible solution.242
It seems that Special Rapporteur Barboza is perfectly capable of appreciating the "advantages" and "flexibility" of a strict liability approach
even though he seems more than reluctant to open this approach to
debate.
B.

The Prevention Issue

With his Fifth Report, Ambassador Barboza, by modifying and expanding his draft articles on "Co-operation," "Prevention" and "Reparation,"24 3 also seems to be moving back toward a Quentin-Baxter-type position on prevention and a recognition of the need for residual rules.
Indeed, he states that "[iun the absence of a specific regime for a specific
activity, a general regime would be required which would be that contained in our articles, which establishes obligations to inform, notify, negotiate a regime and negotiate with a view to possible reparation, according to certain criteria, for the injury caused."2"
The treatment of the prevention issue was one of the great failures of
the draft articles presented in Ambassador Barboza's Fourth Report. Although he seemed to claim there that his risk-based liability would effec-

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 1 49.
Id. at 50.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16 (Articles 7, 8 and 9).
Id. at 15.
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tuate prevention as well as reparation/compensation, the Fourth Report
was not at all clear on that point. Indeed, Special Rapporteur Barboza
admitted that he had no fundamental conceptual framework for prevention: "[iun order to include prevention in the topic, as repeatedly called
for in the Sixth Committee and the Commission, it would be useful to
establish an underlying principle.""' 5
Promoting prevention has, since the beginning of work on this topic,
been one of the primary goals. Indeed, all efforts to codify and/or develop
the law in this area have revolved around the twin poles of prevention
and reparation/compensation. The Secretariat reviewed numerous issues
in connection with prevention, noting that both the procedural and substantive aspects of prevention have been considered and provided for in
both treaties and state practice.2"' Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
consistently recognized the importance of prevention, stating that it was
his intention to emphasize prevention as well as reparation: "[t]he Special
Rapporteur's second major concern was to ensure that the topic would
give pride of place to the duty, wherever possible, to avoid causing injuries, rather than to the substituted duty of providing reparation for injury
caused." 4"
Because Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter considered prevention
to be one of the twin poles of his topic, he developed a "soft law" continuum of obligations - to prevent, to inform, to negotiate, and to repair the operation of which would not require a finding of liability or responsibility based on wrongfulness."" The elements of the obligation-of-States
regime constructed by Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter appear in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of his Schematic Outline, which first appeared in his

245. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at § 103. His Fourth Report draft article on prevention provided that "[slource States shall take all reasonable preventive measures to prevent
or minimize injury that may result from an activity which presumably involves risk and for
which no regime has been established." Id. at § 17. Aside from the redundancy, the use of
"presumably" seemed inappropriate for an instrument that proposed to impose international obligations. It also seemed inconsistent with the "appreciable risk" standard established in his draft Article 1. Id. But Special Rapporteur Barboza seemed to intend that that,
too, be controlled by his risk-based analysis.
246. Secretariat Study, supra note 214, at 253.
247. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at § 9. See also Quentin-Baxter
Fourth Report, supra note 50, at § 50 ("majority opinion in the Sixth Committee has each
year given a strong endorsement to the proposal that prevention and reparation should both
be treated in the context of this topic"); and Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at
§ 46 ("there is enormous strength in the theme of voluntarism. The compulsion to regulate
dangers is provided by facts, not by law").
248. Professor Magraw refers to this as a "compound 'primary' obligation," Magraw I,
supra note 5, at 311, "based in large part on the concepts of good faith, cooperation, and
bon voisinage between the 'acting state' (also referred to as the 'source state') and the 'affected state' (i.e., the state that is being or may be harmed) ..
" Magraw II, supra note
222, at 1043. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter stated in his Third Report that "[plerhaps
the most important policy aim of the present topic is to promote agreements between States
in order to reconcile, rather than inhibit, activities which are predominantly beneficial, despite some nasty side effects." Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 39.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:2

Third Report. They represent his attempt to work out the relationship
between prevention and reparation that he considered at the heart of liability for acts not prohibited by international law. In his view "[o]ne great
advantage of these proposals is that they place side by side, and on the
same level, elements of prevention and of reparation for future loss or
'
injury." 249
It is only when events move off this continuum, with a failure
to make reparation, that state responsibility for a wrongful act comes into
play, yet, as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter put it:
long before that point is reached, the acting State - if the risk of loss
or injury was forseeable - will have had every encouragement to
make proper provision, in consultation and negotiation with States
likely to be affected, to minimize the risks and to arrange suitable
coverage for any risks that are regarded as unavoidable and
unacceptable.25
If the consultations and negotiations required fail to lead to "an agreed
regime" for loss or injury, the "record of what transpired" during the process of consultation and negotiation "will provide the best evidence" of
the affected State's right to reparation/compensation. 5
Moreover, in
such a situation, "any failure of co-operation at an earlier stage may jus2 52
tify an inference in favour of an opposite party.
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter specified that the obligations of
informing and negotiating contained in Section 2 and 3 did not, if vio'
lated, "give rise to any right of action."253
Special Rapporteur Quentin-

249. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 1 21. The Special Rapporteur
stated that it was his view that "[p]rinciples 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration exactly
represent the relationship between the goals of prevention and reparation for which the
Commission should strive." Id. at 17.
250. Id. at 1 18.
251. Id. at t 26.
.252. Id. at 28. Chernobyl made it clear that the notification and assistance provisions
included on Mr. Quentin-Baxter's continuum are crucial. Within months, two new treaties
had been drawn up under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370
(1986), provides that "in the event of any accident involving facilities or activities of a State
Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control," id., art. 1, the State
Party shall "forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency
* . .those States which are or may be physically affected." Id., art. II. The Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 1377 (1986), provides that a State Party that "needs assistance in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency
originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control ...
may call for such assistance from
any other State party .. " Id. at 1378.
253. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 51; Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at Annex. On the Watercourses topic, although Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey skates closer to a hard law obligation in the area of prevention, he, too, avoids
establishing an absolute rule: "While there is authority supporting.... an obligation not to
cause environmental harm, the Special Rapporteur believes that there is particular need for
the progressive development of international law in this area." McCaffrey Fourth Report,
supra note 52, at 89 (Comment (19)).
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Baxter stated that he believed his approach "reduces the nightmare that
a State may be absolutely liable for all physical transboundary loss or
injury generated within its territory or under its control to the not so
impossible dream that State's are never without the shadow of an obligation." '54 He emphasized this again later in the same Report:
The strength of the proposed articles lies, first, in their affirmation
that a source State is never without a legal responsibility in relation to
things done, within its territory or under its control, which give rise or
may give rise to a physical consequence affecting the use or enjoyment
of areas beyond the limits of that State's jurisdiction. Secondly, subject to any rules of prohibition of customary law - which lie outside
the scope of the present articles - the normal way for the source
State to discharge its responsibility is by reaching agreement with affected States upon measures to prevent, or minimize and repair, the
actual or prospective adverse transboundary effects. Failing the possibility of such agreement, the source State remains accountable for the
adequacy of its own efforts to take and implement the measures which
pay due regard to the interests of other States. Thirdly, these rules
are supported by the whole range of treaty and claims practice examined in the Secretariat's extremely valuable analytical study ...
Finally, against the background of rules and precepts already mentioned, there is enormous strength in the theme of voluntarism. The
compulsion to regulate is provided by facts, not by law. If law seeks to
assert a compulsion of its own divorced from fact, the impetus to legal
development is lost in empty disputation whether States act freely in
their own domain, or are constrained by need for prior agreement.,66
Well aware of the dangers of such "empty disputation," Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, in his efforts to fulfill what he viewed as his task
of "legal development," walked a fine line between the opposing doctrinal
views at play here. Although his "soft law" continuum of obligations
might seem, by virtue of its softness, unsatisfactory or inappropriate, it

254. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 43.
255. Id. at 46. Professor Pinto has underscored Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
point that it is the facts of pollution situations and other risks to man and the environment,
rather than doctrinal concerns, that are the best motivation for the establishment of law in
this area. In his view, the mechanism for the duty to cooperate set forth in the schematic
outline, which he believes be the basis for "a multilateral 'umbrella' treaty," seems to
contemplate two tiers of obligations: some that are contingent but arise directly from the treaty upon the occurrence of specified events, e.g., the perception of one State that an activity within its territory or control may give rise to
loss or injury to persons or things within the territory or control of another
State; and others that are in the nature of pacta de contrahendo and amount
to agreements to enter into more specific arrangements as situations of risk
emerge. In either case, the proposal moves in the direction of making obligations into questions of fact, thereby maximizing the agreement's efficacy; for
one of the most intractable difficulties connected with compelling co-operation
must surely be to demonstrate the breach of an obligation by a State under a
duty to cooperate where, in fact, it takes no action at all.
Pinto, supra note 45, at 38.
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has the virtue of satisfying neither the "wrongfulness" nor the "strict liability" camp. Moreover, it has met with generally favorable comment by
publicists.2 56
Despite the general approval, however, two aspects of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's schematic outline met with rather more criticism, and do indeed seem rather troublesome: the "shared expectations"
standard for reparation and the "balancing of interests" that is to guide
negotiations and reparations.25 7 "Shared expectations" and "balancing of
interests" are chancy propositions at best in an international system of
States representing heterogeneous cultures and values.2"' Recalling that

256. Professor Magraw speaks favorably of the "hybrid" regime, and states his opinion
that "the fact that the 'compound 'primary' obligation' includes three duties (to prevent,
inform and negotiate) whose 'breach' does not entail international wrongfulness ... is not
problematic as long as the other legal consequences of their 'breach' are sufficiently clear."
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 317. He compares the obligations imposed under Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's continuum to "the nonbinding international agreement frequently
encountered in international relations, whose utility and acceptability are recognized." Id.
Professor McCaffrey calls the "entire set of procedures" set forth by Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter "a finely-tuned mechanism which takes into account, insofar as possible, the needs of the two countries concerned, and avoids pointing the finger of blame at
either." McCaffrey, An Update on the Contributionsof the InternationalLaw Commission
to International Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L., 667, 678 (1985). Professor McCaffrey
also expresses the opinion that
there is clearly a need to complement liability rules regarding transboundary
environmental problems with the kind of approach envisioned by Professor
Quentin-Baxter - namely a system of procedural, dispute-avoidance mechanisms that factor in the needs and values of all concerned parties. This was a
large part of Professor Quentin-Baxter's vision and it is to be hoped that it will
become a reality within the near future.
Id.
Professor Pinto says that "[iun essence, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the Commission move in the direction of recognizing a 'duty of co-operation.'" Pinto, supra note 45,
at 36. He points out that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's route is one "travelled by
some municipal law systems," where it has been determined that
questions of liability for certain types of transboundary harm are of such complexity that they cannot be satisfactorily resolved by reference merely to such
indicators as "fault" or "strict liability," but require examination in the light of
a variety of factors which can be adequately revealed and significantly applied
only through the positive co-operation of States concerned, procured through a
regime built with principles of customary law derived from existing treaties
and supported by an "obligation to cooperation."
Id. at 36-37.
Despite his approval of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's approach, which he terms
"correct," Professor Pinto also warns that "it is important not to minimize the difficulties
likely to emerge in the establishment and operation of a regime of cooperation, a notion the
legal context of which is being examined closely for the first time." Id. at 37.
257. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 53; Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at Annex.
258. Professor Pinto has stated that "[dlisparities in value-systems among the States
concerned could well render it extremely difficult to give effect to the Schematic Outline's
requirement that "The reparation due to the affected State ... shall be ascertained in accordance with the shared expectation of the States concerned .. " Pinto, supra note 45,
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not all agree on the existence of customary international law with respect
to environmental harm, it seems especially hard to imagine the existence
of sufficient accord between developing and developed states for there to
' 9
be any reason to discuss "shared expectations."28
Special Rapporteur Barboza, who, in his Preliminary Report, stated
that the Commission and the General Assembly had reacted favorably to
his predecessor's schematic outline,"' initially accepted the idea that
compensation/reparation for injury, prevention and the procedures outlined in the schematic outline were all to be included within the scope of
the topic." ' But by the next year he was questioning the appropriateness
of having a violation of the obligation to inform not give rise to a cause of

at 42.

Prosser and Keaton, writing in a domestic law context about strict liability norms were
also sensitive to the cultural relevancies that make agreement on "shared expectations" difficult, if not impossible to achieve:
The place where all this occurs, the customs of the community, and the natural
fitness or adaptation of the premises for the purpose are all highly important
in determining whether the rule [i.e., the strict liability rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher] applies. In Burma an elephant is not a non-natural creature, but a
domestic animal, no more a subject of strict liability than a horse; but the same
elephant, transported to England in a circus, becomes an abnormal danger to
that community.
PROSSER, supra note 214 at § 78.
Professor Magraw, while criticizing strict liability for what he perceives to be its inflexibility and lack of sensitivity to varying conditions, nevertheless, when comparing it to the
regime of the schematic outline, found that it has several merits:
[Sitrict liability is relatively straightforward to apply and avoids the need to
try to balance such numerous and amorphous interests as those found in the
schematic outline - a process whose uncertainty is increased by the need to
consider the undefined "shared expectations" of the states involved. One response is that it may be useful to know which standard is to applied, regardless
of how marshy that standard is. But that argument does not eliminate the
defects of balancing tests - i.e., they allow easy manipulation by decision
makers and do not lead to predictability of outcome. The content of the balance-of-interests test - i.e., the criteria to be considered and their order of
priority, if any - will determine how workable the test is. That content is
expected to be further developed (and, one hopes to become more certain) as
the Commission continues its study.
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 327.
259. Professor Magraw has noted that shared expectations "may not exist between a
developed state and a developing state in the same sense, or to the same degree, that such
expectations exist between two developed states (or, possibly, two developing states)."
Magraw II, supra note 222, at 1058. He also reports that he was not able, in any of Special
Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's Reports, to find any instance "of shared expectations or a lack
thereof, between developed and developing states." Id. at note 109.
Professor Rest attributes the lack of effective international law on liability for environmental damage "to the inhomogeneity of national environmental policies that often lack the
insight that they are tied together by particular environmental media, and fail to exercise
solidarity." Rest, supra note 152, at 335.
260. Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at

261. Id. at

9.

8.
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action, 6 2 and referring to the "soft-law" obligation to negotiate not as an
"incomplete obligation" but rather as "one whose violation is not always
'
He proposed deleting Special Rapporteur Quentineasy to determine."263
Baxter's specific pronouncements that violation of the duty to inform and
negotiate do not "give rise to any right of action. ' 264 He stated that, in his
opinion, "the obligations to inform and to negotiate are sufficiently wellestablished in international law, and any breach of these obligations thus
gives rise to wrongfulness,"26 but declared "that does not mean they cannot be included in our draft."2 6 He finessed this apparent contradiction
by referring to an earlier discussion of the scope of the topic in which he
took the position that the French title of the topic, which refers to "activities," 26is more accurate than the English version, which speaks of
"acts."
In Special Rapporteur Barboza's view
[a]ctivities are shaped by complex and varied components which are
so interrelated that they are almost indistinguishable from one another. Around a given activity there are countless individual acts
which are intimately related to the activity. Some of these acts may
well be wrongful, but that does not make the activity itself
268
wrongful.
In his Fourth Report, Special Rapporteur Barboza repeated his belief
that these obligations are "autonomous precisely because they appear to
have an established place in general international law."'269 He then proceeded to back away from this, and adopted virtually the same approach
as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, by stating that the " 'pure' obligation of prevention . . . appears to be not autonomous, but directly linked
with the injury."27 He also acknowledged that allowing for a finding of
wrongfulness based upon a violation of the obligations to inform and negotiate, raises fears about (1) "superimposing a regime of wrongfulness on
a regime of causal responsibility," (2) attaching too much importance to

262. First Report, supra note 6, at 39.
263. Id. at T 40.
264. Id. at 41(c).
265. Id. at 67.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 68. Ambassador Barboza returns to this distinction in his Fifth Report,
where he notes that use of "the concept of 'activity' as opposed to 'act' " . . . is important
for limiting the scope of the draft because, in one of its meanings, liability refers to the
consequences of certain conducts. According to this meaning
"liability" refers only to acts, to which legal consequences can be attributed,
and not to activities, because causality originates in specific acts, not activities .... In order for the regime of our articles to apply to certain acts, these
acts must be inseperably linked to an activity which ... has to involve risk or
have harmful effects .... Injury caused by isolated acts is not covered . ..
and so we avoid the dreaded absolute liability.
12-14.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at
268. Id.
269. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 107.
270. Id. at 108.
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prevention rather than reparation, and (3) placing "unacceptable limits
on freedom of initiative in the territory of the source State," to the extent
that "the territorial sovereignty of the affected State would thus take precedence over that of the source State, with the establishment of a virtual
veto against the conduct of useful activities of its territory." '' He acknowledged that his draft, as it stood at that point, contained no safeguards against these possibilities. In his Fourth Report, he merely stated
that the link of liability for violation of the obligation of prevention
with
27 2
occurrence of injury "should be expressed in a later article.
With his Fifth Report, however, Ambassador Barboza again moves
back toward the Quentin-Baxter position. As we have seen, he states that
his approach is one of a continuum of residual obligations. 7 3 He has significantly expanded and refined the article on co-operation, 7 and has
strengthened the prevention article.2 7 5 Prevention seems to be in the process of being restored to its rightful place, even though that proper place
might be hard to locate precisely under the absolute but poorly articu-

271. Id. at 110. The problems with this approach are similar to those Professor Handl
saw with a risk-based analysis in general: that they "open the door to injunctive relief"-for
the "risk of future accidents or for the failure to inform or negotiate." Handl II, supra note
45, at 65.
272. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 111.
273. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 15.
274. Compare:

States shall co-operate in good faith in preventing or minimizing the risk of
transboundary injury or, if injury has occurred, in minimizing its effects both
in affected States and in source States.
In accordance with the above provision, the duty to co-operate applies to
source States in relation to affected States, and vice versa.
Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 17, with:
States shall co-operate in good faith among themselves, and request the assistance of any international organizations that might be able to help them, in
trying to prevent any activities referred to in article 1 carried out in their territory or in other places under their jurisdiction or control from causing transboundary injury. If such injury occurs, the State of origin shall co-operate with
the affected State in minimizing its effects. In the event of injury caused by an
accident, the affected State shall, if possible, also co-operate with the State of
origin with regard to any harmful effects which may have arisen in the territory of the State of origin or in other places under its jurisdiction or control.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at

16.

275. He has removed the limitation imposed by use of the word "presumably" in the
prevention article proposed in his Fourth Report ("Source States shall take all reasonable
preventive measures to prevent or minimize injury that may result from an activity which
presumably involves risk and for which no regime has been established"), Fourth Report,
supra note 8, at 17, and substituted the phrase "appropriate measures" for the unquantifiable "reasonable measures," and altered the language so as to indicate that tolerating risk of
transboundary harm can be understood not be a readily acceptable alternative:
States of origin shall take appropriate measures to prevent, or, where necessary, minimize the risk of transboundary injury. To that end they shall, in so
far as they are able, use the best practicable, available means with regard to
activities referred to in article 1.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at

16.
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lated standards Ambassador Barboza set forth in his Fourth Report.
C.

The "Appreciable Risk" Issue

Related to and intertwined with his modifications on the wrongfulness and prevention issues, Ambassador Barboza has also, with his Fifth
Report, significantly modified his definition of the "appreciable risk" that
must be present to bring activities within the scope of the draft
27
articles. 1
From the beginning of the Commission's work on this topic, the focus
has been on injury or harm as the predicate for liability. In his Fourth
Report Special Rapporteur Barboza stated that "[o]bviously, the basis of
2 77
the obligation to make reparation in the matter before us is injury,
but did not explore how that obligation might be effected by the change
he had proposed for the scope of the topic, which, under the draft articles
he was then proposing, dealt with activities that "create an appreciable
risk . . . of transboundary injury" rather than activities that "give rise or
may give rise to an adverse "physical consequence. "278
The "appreciable risk" standard Special Rapporteur Barboza's pro2 79
posed with draft article 1 of his Fourth Report could not be quantified.
His standard seemed to be risk "appreciable to any normal person." The
complexity of existing technology and the constant advances in the ability
of technology to define, detect and measure "risk" as well as the technologies for activities that will certainly, likely or possibly create new risks,
are in constant flux.2 s0 How Special Rapporteur Barboza reached the con-

276. See Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 17, art. 1.
277. Id. at
41, 44.
278. Special Rapporteur Barboza insisted on adding "adverse" to describe the consequences of the lawful acts in question in this topic. See Third Report, supra note 206, at 1
42-43. This seems to be as straightforward an improvement as the earlier modification that
made it clear that only "physical" consequences were intended to be covered. See QuentinBaxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 63. See also McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 206-09
(1983).
279. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 84.
280. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has published a study detailing what is involved in "risk assessment," which it referred to as "the emerging core of the
law of chemical regulation." According to the Association's Committee on Environmental
Law:
During the past two decades, toxicological research has begun to reveal the
hidden costs of chemical dispersion in the general and workplace environments. In the difficult process of adapting to this new information, producers
and regulators must identify and reduce the latent health and environmental
costs of chemicals in the economy.
Risk assessment is an interdisciplinary method of calculating the health
risks of a particular activity, product, or waste dispersion. It draws on the expertise of engineers, meteorologists, hydrogeologists, demographers, and health
scientists - such as toxicologists, epidemiologists, and medical doctors - to
provide public policy makers with a means of estimating the risks of exposure
to chemicals.
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clusion that a panel of international law experts who meet once a year for
only a few weeks could create a standard for such a complex issue with a
simple formula of virtually undefined words is a mystery. An even greater
mystery was how Special Rapporteur Barboza expected sovereign States
with varying degrees of sophistication and expertise in the many and varied technological areas of the known (much less the unknown) potential
sources of transboundary harm to agree to bind themselves internationally and accept international imposition of liability for such activities.
According to the explanation Special Rapporteur Barboza offered in
his Fourth Report, "[a]ppreciable risk" is "risk which may be identified
through a simple examination of the activity and the substances involved. 2 8 1 Ambassador Barboza alleged that this standard "does not exclude risks which are not easily seen but which, for one reason or another,
are already known to exist; nor does it exclude from future consideration
risks which are hidden and become evident at a later stage," ' 2 but how

A risk estimate is essentially an equation. It incorporates a series of secondary estimates: the amount and type of pollutant that will be dispersed by
the activity under study, the numbers of people who will be exposed, the
length and dose of exposure, the chemical characteristics of the substance, any
known human health effects of exposure to the substance, and the results of
laboratory experiments in which animals have been subjected to high levels of
exposure. The results of studies in each of these dimensions are combined into
a composite risk estimate, a final range of numbers, or single number with an
uncertainty factor.
Although its use is not mandated or authorized by any particular law, risk
assessment is becoming a central tool of public and private planners. Some
courts have also allowed the introduction of risk assessments as evidence. Risk
assessment is unfolding as a dominant approach to regulation of chemicals,
perhaps because it seems to provide the law with some underlying consistency.
In fact, the course of the evolution of the methodology has itself become a
major controversy and an arena for debate over the future of chemical
regulation.
Committee on Environmental Law, Toxic Chemicals and Health Risk Assessments in
Regulation and Litigation,44 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF CITY OF NEW
YORK, No. 4, 391, 391-92 (1989). For an environmentalist's point of view on the quantification of risk, see Mathews, Is There More Risk in the World? Washington Post, March 29,
1989 at A25. Another 'lay' discussion of risk assessment is contained in Assessing Risk: A
Risky Business, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1989, at C3. Balanced against these complex
analyses is Special Rapporteur Barboza's statement that: "[tihe risk must be appreciable
according to the normal criteria or standards for the use of the substances which are the
object or the product of the activity, or the result of the situations." Fourth Report, supra
note 8, at 26.
For additional assessments of the problems of risk management, see, e.g., Starr, Risk
Management is the Goal, RISK ASSESSMENT ABSTRACTS, 41 (1984); Wilson & Crouch, Risk
Assessment & Comparisons: An Introduction, 236 SCIENCE 267 (1987); and Kasperson &
Kasperson, Prioritiesin Profile: Managing Risks in Developing Countries, RISK ASSESSMENT ABSTRACTS 113 (1988).
281. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 17, Article 2(a).
282. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 24. It is for precisely this sort of defining by
"legislative history" rather than competent drafting that Ambassador Barboza has bitterly
criticized Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter. See, e.g., Third Report, supra note 206, at
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liability that is applicable to, as he stated it later, risks that are "visible
on first examination,"' 5 could be said to encompass hidden risks was
simply not understandable.28 Moreover, Special Rapportuer Barboza, in
another virtually meaningless phrase, announced that "the risk must be
general."' 85
Another of Special Rapporteur Barboza's quiet changes in his Fifth
Report seems to sweep away many of these problems, and to reintroduce
the approach of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter. Now he states that
"in activities involving risk, the 'appreciable risk' mentioned must be that
of causing 'appreciable injury' if prevention is to be demanded.""2 '

41, where he discusses how Mr. Quentin-Baxter dealt with the issue of "adverse" consequences in Commission discussions, putting his views on the record in that fashion rather
than including them in his article that defined the scope of the topic.
283. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 30.
284. Ambassador Barboza's emphasis on risk, and immediately discernable risk, as the
key to liability is apparent yet again when he states that the scope of the topic relates only
to "liability for risk" and that "injury is not compensable merely because it has occurred,
but because it corresponds to a certain general prediction that it was going to occur, since
the activity which eventually caused it creates a risk, is dangerous." Id. at 45. Hidden
risks, and those that develop or manifest themselves only after a long period are clearly not
susceptible to a "general prediction" that they will occur.
285. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 26. Equally confusing was Special Rapporteur
Barboza's discussion, in his Third Report, of activities that do "not call for diagnosis of the
risk involved," which would, it seems, involve situations where neither the source State nor
the victim "created the general risk." He concluded that the topic would not encompass
such activities, because to do so would involve "absolute risk." Third Report, supra note
206, at T 16. He also stated that if such liability were to be imposed "no new activity would
be lawful until such time as it had been monitored by an international agency which would
declare that its lowest possible risks had been accepted by any States which might be affected." Id. This raised several questions: if this was how he intended the usual analysis for
appreciable risk to proceed, how was this to relate to the "immediately discernable" risk
standard; how can one ever be sure that all States that may be affected by an activity have
been identified; and would a State be presumed to fall without the "appreciable risk" standard if all other States that might be affected by the activity in question accepted the risks
involved as the "lowest possible." Special Rapporteur Barboza's articles as proposed in his
Fourth Report actually anticipate uncompensated victims. Ambassador Barboza has himself
stated that "not all injury is compensable under international law," because there is no
"norm of international law" that so requires. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 11 38-40. See
discussion of wrongfulness vs. strict liability at notes 218-242 and accompanying text, supra.
Where, in this, was there any consideration of Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, of
Special Rapporteur's Quentin-Baxter's principle, in his Schematic Outline, that "an innocent victim should not be left to bear his loss of injury," Quentin-Baxter Third Report,
supra note 5, at 53 (Schematic Outline, Section 5, 1 3), and of "[t]he common thread of all
the discourse" and perhaps the customary law on the topic that "in principle the innocent
victims of an activity that entails some danger should not be left to bear their loss, even if
the actor's conduct is without taint of wrongfulness." Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report,
supra note 42, at $ 28. Even if Ambassador Barboza was correct that these principles do not
amount to a "norm" of international law, what was he allowing to happen to the Commission's commitment to developing international law in this area?
286. Fifth Report, supra note 14 at 24. Sounding more and more like an advocate of a
soft-law continuum, he goes on to state that "[w]hile we cannot be overly strict in dealing
with the question of 'appreciable' risk and injury, the limits of which are somewhat blurred,
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In the three areas outlined above, Special Rapporteur Barboza's approaches to his work on the International Liability topic, have, in his
most recent Report, been somewhat modified from the extreme and unworkable proposals he made earlier. These changes indicate that Special
Rapporteur Barboza is, in a practical sense, moving the contours of the
topic back closer to where they were with Special Rapporteur QuentinBaxter's proposals. He is thus also probably, finally, moving the international community somewhat closer to a consensus on this important
topic.
CONCLUSION

Strict liability has an ominous sound. It sounds automatic, absolute
and final even though it is none of these. The legislatures and judicial
bodies around the world that have adopted strict liability standards in
various fields have done so as a matter of public policy, and have found it
to be a flexible tool, one that provides compensation for injuries suffered
and one that serves as a effective incentive for prevention. Despite the
fact that States are, in many cases, resistant to the idea of strict liability,
and might hesitate to agree to such a standard because they view it as a
potential infringement on their sovereignty, it is the standard most likely
to serve the purpose of the International Liability topic - creation of
residual rules to apply in situations, especially those involving transboundary pollution, where States are not yet able to reach agreement on
internationally enforcible standards.
On the issue of prevention, it is important to note that strict liability
is only imposed upon the occurrence of injury that public policy has determined must be compensated and/or repaired. It does not attach merely
for the creation of the risk of such injury. Reaction to Special Rapporteur
Barboza's risk-based proposal as the standard for liability confirmed that
such an approach is unworkable. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
work on prevention, and the continuum of duties and obligations he projected for States, while unconventional and innovative, was workable and
would have created a regime to which States would be much more likely
to agree. As Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter said (in commenting on
the reputation of the Trail Smelter decision), an unjustified "eclipse...

in principle this adjective must be applied to both concepts .... The word 'appreciable' is
used to describe both the risk and the injury because it seems to denote an appropriate
threshold of tolerance, although one obviously cannot be certain as to its exact limits." Id.
at I 24-25. He acknowledges he is conforming his approach to that of Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey (see notes 236-38 and accompanying text, supra): "The word 'appreciable' is also
used to qualify the term 'harm' in the draft on international watercourses and, while uniformity is not obligatory, we believe that the similarities between two topics justify the view
that the terms used in both should be harmonized." Id. at 26. In his Fifth Report, he also
modified the poorly expressed definitional article on "appreciable risk," elaborating on the
simple examination of the activity" that is supposed to be determinative of the existence of
appreciable risk. Compare Fourth Report, supra note 8, at V 16 with Fifth Report, supra
note 14, at 17.
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attends the work of some artists of good reputation in the period after
their deaths."28 7 Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's work needs to be
rescued from its unjustified eclipse and reconsidered. Special Rapporteur
Barboza seems to have begun this process of necessity, based on the negative reaction to his Fourth Report. He should acknowledge that this is
what he has done and afford Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's memory the credit due it by reincorporating even more of his work in the current proposals on this topic.
Special Rapporteur Barboza should also guide the Commission, the
Sixth Committee and the international community as a whole in a reasoned consideration of the issue of strict liability for transnational environmental damage. To enable such a debate to take place, he should offer
coherent explanations of the parameters and implications of strict liability. He should also encourage development of a workable (which almost
certainly means a Quentin-Baxter-type "soft law" regime) framework for
prevention of transboundary pollution. The obligation to do so is not just
Special Rapporteur Barboza's - it is all of ours, and it is an obligation
we owe to the environment itself as well as all those who live off its
bounty now and all those who should have that bounty available to them
in the future.

287. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at

22.

